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ABSTRACT 
 Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream has elicited the assistance of ethnic Chinese people 
around the world in achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The People’s 
Republic of China has not hidden its intent at influencing the overseas Chinese diaspora 
having embarked on a soft power campaign to achieve its geopolitical objectives. Using 
its extensive state media apparatus, the PRC has extended its media influence throughout 
the globe with a persistent narrative conforming to the China “story” developed by the 
Chinese Communist Party. This study determines the extent to which China leverages its 
state media and diaspora to promote its narratives regarding its core national interests 
around the world. These interests concern primarily its issues over sovereignty to include 
the South China Sea, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. This study includes a quantitative 
analysis through regression testing of a sample of Twitter and media archive data and 
United Nations migrant data. Furthermore, this study highlighted several regional cases 
in Oceania—namely, Australia and New Zealand—and Southeast Asia in a qualitative 
analysis to answer this study’s research question. Overall, this study found significance of 
a relationship between Tweets regarding the PRC’s core national issues and the Chinese 
diaspora implicating overseas Chinese communities’ contribution to the PRC’s 
geopolitical narratives. 
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This thesis attempts to re-trace the process by which the Chinese government, via 
its state media apparatus and ethnic diaspora communities, could influence the 
international population. We hypothesize a trilateral relationship, in which the Chinese 
diaspora, through its bifurcated cultural and psychological allegiances, can serve as an 
intermediary channeling Beijing’s strategic messages to the mainstream audience of the 
host country. Specifically, we set out to test the commonly held belief that the Chinese 
diaspora, often viewed as model immigrants in their respective host countries, can impart 
a “goodwill” effect on the wider population, indirectly improving the favorability of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) abroad.  
To test this notion, we first measured PRC’s ability to promote its narratives via the 
circulation of Chinese state media contents on social media around the world. Next, we 
gauged China’s favorability abroad based on the volume of anti-China hashtags 
encountered on Twitter. Finally, we looked for empirical evidences that would link 
countries with a relatively larger population of Chinese diaspora to higher circulation of 
Beijing’s narratives as well as fewer anti-China posts in their respective national social 
media.  
Surprisingly, results from our regression analysis have contradicted some of the 
key tenets behind our initial hypotheses. Key findings are listed below: 
• A larger Chinese diaspora population does not necessarily lead to higher 
salience of Beijing’s narratives abroad, and the pattern could in fact be the 
opposite.  
• Cumulating evidence suggests that the “Chinese Diaspora as Beijing’s 
Goodwill Ambassador” notion requires further qualification. Our regression 
results indicate that the presence of recent Chinese migrants from mainland 
China might be associated with increased mainstream backlash against 
Beijing’s narratives and consequently could devalue the Chinese 
government’s credibility around the world. 
xviii 
• Chinese state media content covering sensitive topics—Xinjiang, Taiwan, 
Tibet, and South China Sea—generates most of the international public 
interest in Beijing’s narratives, while at the same time stirring anti-China 
sentiments. One conclusion could be that not all publicity is good publicity 




I. INTRODUCTION  
Since Deng Xiaoping’s Opening Reform in 1978, the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) has benefited from unprecedented economic growth, transforming the country into 
a formidable world power contender at a historic pace. China’s meteoric rise has 
understandably alarmed the U.S., the dominant power in the current world order. 
Naysayers have warned that China’s resurging influence in Asia could come at the expense 
of the United States’ strategic interests in the region. Some have analogized the current 
geopolitical rivalry to a “Thucydides’ Trap,” a term coined by Allison Graham to describe 
the inevitable conflict between a rising power and a status-quo power. Steering the U.S. 
away from the impending Thucydides’ Trap has since become the popular war cry for the 
China hawks inside the Belt Way. Their concerns are not unfounded. Within a span of a 
few years, the international community has witnessed an increasingly confrontational 
China, not only in rhetoric but also in the implementation of its foreign policy. China’s 
global narrative has escalated from Hu Jintao’s “Peaceful Rise and Co-existence” in 2007 
to Xi Jinping’s not-so-subtle prescription of the Beijing Consensus for the world today. 
While the PRC possesses one of the most powerful militaries in the world, its leaders 
rightly recognize the danger of an open and armed confrontation with the U.S. Rather, the 
PRC appears to be less reserved in leveraging other instruments of national power to 
compete against the U.S.—namely, on the diplomatic, economic, and informational fronts. 
These more indirect forms of competition will serve as the conceptual point of departure 
for this thesis. 
A. STRATEGIC CONTEXT 
One strategy that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has demonstrated affinity 
for is Joseph Nye’s famed soft power (软实力, ruan shili) approach. A regime will focus on 
attraction rather than coercion as a function of its national power to induce favorable 
behaviors from its neighbors.1 This is not to imply that all of China’s soft power efforts 
                                                 




undertaken thus far have only furthered its geopolitical self-interest – as there could exist 
equally benign rationales. For one, an improved cross-cultural understanding and 
interaction could lead to a mutually beneficial end in all rational actors’ calculus. This 
ongoing debate over Chinese strategic intention provides the contextual backdrop to this 
thesis. The broad purpose of this study is to reduce some of the uncertainties over this topic, 
which in turn, could help us better discern the PRC’s ultimate soft power objectives. 
B. SOFT POWER: FROM THE DIASPORA’S PERSPECTIVE 
A strategic advantage that the PRC already possesses is its large and influential 
overseas diaspora of ethnic Chinese, known as Haiwai Huaqiao (海外华侨). In recent years, 
the Chinese diaspora has proven its political weight by generating a seemingly “domestic” 
pro-PRC voice within their host country’s pluralistic policymaking process. Examples 
range from the CCP’s efforts to groom pro-PRC ethnic Chinese politicians inside the 
Australian legislature to Beijing’s leverage of Chinese international students in the U.S. 
and Canada to censor the mentioning of Falun Gong and Tibet Independence in Western 
academia. 2  Conventional wisdom suggests that Beijing’s investment in its overseas 
diaspora constitutes an integral component of its global soft power strategy.3 A politically 
mobilized and PRC-leaning diaspora community, after all, could readily promote Beijing’s 
narratives in their respective host countries with more convincing power than any foreign 
sovereign could wield. Yet, Western understanding of this subject remains limited, 
preventing U.S. policy makers from fully understanding the diaspora’s role in China’s 
influence campaign. In the age of an instantaneous global information environment, where 
the prerogative for disseminating and accessing information has been democratized to the 
everyday social media user, Beijing now has perhaps the greatest opportunity to amplify 
the effects of its soft power instrument.  
                                                 
2 Rob Schmitz, “Australia and New Zealand Are Ground Zero for Chinese Influence,” National Public Radio, 
October 2, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/10/02/627249909/australia-and-new-zealand-are-ground-zero-for-chinese-
influence. 
3 Sheng Ding, “Chinese Soft Power and Public Diplomacy: An Analysis of China’s New Diaspora Engagement 




C. RESEARCH QUESTION AND WAY AHEAD 
Under this premise, this thesis will attempt to re-trace the process by which the 
Chinese government, via its state media apparatus, could influence its diaspora as well as 
the international population at large. We envision this to be a trilateral relationship, in 
which the diaspora, through its bifurcated cultural and psychological allegiances, can serve 
as an intermediary channeling Beijing’s strategic messages to the mainstream audience of 
the host country. Our central research question is: how and to what extent has the PRC 
been able to leverage the strength of its state media infrastructure and the overseas Chinese 
diaspora to better project its preferred narratives on the global stage?  
The first part of the question—the “how”—focuses on forms and functions and will 
require an explication of the PRC’s current theoretic approach to influence operations. The 
second part—“to what extent”—is an assessment of effectiveness and will require a more 
empirical approach. We will conduct this assessment through a quantitative analysis 
corroborated with qualitative case studies. In the quantitative portion, we will empirically 
analyze the following variables: (1) the PRC’s state media presence abroad, (2) the size of 
the Chinese diaspora and (3) their aggregated impact on the direction of social media 
discussion in countries outside of China. Once a statistical relationship has been identified 
between the variables, the qualitative section of the research will attempt to describe the 
process on the ground as it unfolds. We will reference several countries in Oceania and 
Southeast Asia with large diaspora populations as case studies. The final part of this thesis 
will draw lessons from both the quantitative and qualitative chapters and make 
recommendations to U.S. policy makers and the DOD enterprise alike on ways to exploit 
or mitigate the implications from the findings of this study.  
Ultimately, this study discovers that the PRC’s efforts to exercise its informational 
power, specifically through the internationalization of its state-owned media apparatus, 
may be having an opposite effect of its desired outcome. Instead of developing an appealing 
global image to promote its political agenda—namely, those that protect the PRC’s 
sovereignty and affirm the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) monopoly on power—the 
PRC’s leadership may be further exacerbating intra-demographical tensions throughout the 
world. As such, the ethnic Chinese diaspora, which the CCP has not been secretive about 
 
4 
targeting, may not be responding to the PRC’s media influence efforts as intended. Instead, 
state media activities may be widening the social and ideological rift between recent 
mainland Chinese migrants and members of the “old” Chinese diaspora. While new 
migrants tend to echo China’s state media narrative, the old diaspora appears to be pushing 
back the same; and perhaps the most surprising of all, the presence of large ethnic Chinese 
communities overseas may ultimately subdue the effectiveness of PRC propaganda abroad. 
These findings indicate that nation-states concerned with China’s growing power and 
influence may have an opportunity to capitalize on the heterogeneous nature of the global 
Chinese diaspora to counter the CCP’s international propaganda machine. 
 
5 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The scope of this thesis tangentially intersects with a range of disciplinary fields—
from soft power theory and diaspora politics to Chinese public diplomacy and influence 
strategy. However, this research’s primary contribution to current literature is on the topic 
of the Chinese state media influence in the age of information and communication 
technology, with specific implications for the two primary targets of the PRC’s ongoing 
influence campaign. These targets include the Chinese diaspora abroad and the general 
population in countries of strategic importance to the PRC. We will start our analysis by 
breaking down the components of the conventional country-diaspora relational model and 
examine the interactions amongst each component within the context of mass and social 
media theories. Next, our quantitative research will attempt to identify any statistical 
associations amongst the PRC’s state media, the presence of diaspora, and the direction of 
social media discussion in the greater population. The qualitative aspect of the research 
will then focus on specific case studies to unveil the process on the ground as it unfolds 
where the PRC media infrastructure has historically leveraged its diaspora communities to 
influence social media discussions abroad. Subsequent sections in this literature review 
will provide a primer of the relevant fields of study, highlight existing gaps in the literature, 
and discuss how this research can best fill in some of these voids.  
1. Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics  
In his seminal work, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Joseph 
Nye defined soft power as one country influencing or co-opting another to “want what it 
wants”—the source of power, therefore, derives from attraction values rather than 
traditional coercive measures.4  From this lens, the forms of soft power could be diverse, 
ranging from pop culture and mass media to political ideology and public diplomacy. 
Unsurprisingly, the western concept of “soft power” wields great appeal to the CCP, which 
has demonstrated a historical predisposition for the indirect application of influence since 
                                                 
4 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), xx. 
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its founding. The CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) is certainly no stranger 
to conducting a wide array of influence campaigns against both domestic and foreign actors 
to achieve the Party’s political objectives for the better part of the 20th Century. This trend 
continued well into the new millennium with Hu Jintao famously adopting the phrase “Soft 
Power with Chinese Characteristics” (“具有中国特色的软实力”) in a speech during the 17th 
National People’s Congress in 2007. The former party General Secretary effectively 
codified the term as an official CCP strategy to promote its national interest. In the CCP’s 
version of soft power, however, the focus is on enhancing the appeal of Chinese culture 
abroad (“软实力必须提倡中国文化”).5  
2. Diaspora in the Context of Soft Power Theory 
What role can the diaspora assume in its kin country’s soft power strategy? The 
diaspora can certainly increase the attraction value of its kin country via various non-
coercive means. One theory postulates that successful diaspora communities, through their 
inherent social, economic, and political capital, could indirectly exert influence on the 
wider population of their adopted home country. This influence could translate into an 
expansive power base for the diaspora communities themselves; but more importantly for 
this thesis, a powerful diaspora could also serve the political interests of its ancestral 
country. The academic field of Diaspora Politics is dedicated to understanding this process.  
Fiona Adamson contextualizes diasporas in this political power framework and 
explains that diaspora politics is not a new phenomenon—in fact, it has been widely 
practiced in modern history. Irishman, Sein Fein, and the Chinese Revolutionaries in the 
early 20th Century were amongst the first to introduce “ethnic lobbying” to the political 
vernacular. Adamson takes a broad perspective on the influence that these diasporas wield 
within their host countries, or countries of residence. She conjectures that their expansive 
influence derives from the diaspora leaders being able to “gain access to policy circles, 
                                                 
5 “Hu Jintao Seeks to Enhances Cultural Appeal,” Xinhua, October 15, 2007. 
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resources, and networks in both their country of residence and their ‘homeland,’ as well as 
increasing their status within the group they are seeking to represent.”6  
3. The Influence of the Chinese Diaspora  
There are obvious political and economic incentives for the PRC to engage its vast 
diaspora communities, numbered at 65 million in 2014; many of whom also belongs to the 
top of the income ladder in their respective host countries. The diasporic business 
communities in the so-called “Bamboo Network,” for instance, owns a majority of the most 
profitable business enterprises in Southeast Asia. Together, they hold an impressive $2.5 
trillion in assets, ranking the Chinese diaspora as the eighth largest aggregated holder of 
assets in the world.7 Their economic power often translates to a political one as well, 
creating enduring access to policy circles in their adopted homelands—much as Adamson’s 
theory has predicted. The enormous financial and political leverage that the diaspora 
communities can wield, if they so choose, could significantly benefit China’s strategic 
goals for the region.  
Indeed, a preponderance of China scholars have cautioned that the PRC, through 
various soft power instruments, has already begun co-opting overseas Chinese 
communities to undertake its political biddings. Alexander Bowe’s report to the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission suggests that the UFWD “seeks to co-opt 
ethnic Chinese individuals and communities living outside China” with key affiliated 
organizations guided directly by the Chinese state while other organizations with less 
explicit ties are influenced by the party to an extent.8 In implementation, Mercy Kuo 
                                                 
6 Fiona Adamson, “The Growing Importance of Diaspora Politics” Current History 115, no. 784 (November 
2016): 291–297. 
7 “Xi’s Secret Economic Weapon: Overseas Chinese,” Nikkei Asia Review, April 3, 2017, https://asia.nikkei.com/
Economy/Xi-s-secret-economic-weapon-Overseas-Chinese2. 





suggests that the Chinese diaspora groups have routinely amplified the PRC’s message for 
a peaceful reunification with Taiwan.9  
Through his research at the Air War College on this same topic, Olivier Brault 
hypothesized that the PRC has been operationalizing its diaspora as an integral part of its 
national power instrument. As such, Beijing has embarked on a kind of “charm offensive” 
to actively attract the overseas Chinese communities back into the Party’s embrace. This is 
reflected in a series of favorable Chinese economic policies toward the diaspora as well as 
Beijing’s redoubled efforts to engage with the overseas Chinese community leaders in 
recent years.10 Brault’s study parsed the complex diaspora relational system down to three 
distinct components: the PRC (or kin country), the overseas Chinese diaspora community, 
and the host country (or country of residence).11 This trilateral influence model is useful 
in identifying the relational flows amongst the key stakeholders in diaspora politics. This 
study will adopt the same model as the backbone to subsequent analysis.  
4. Current Schools of Thought on Diaspora Politics 
A brief survey of contemporary literature on diasporas as a political tool of 
influence yields two broad schools of thought that could trace their theoretical origins to 
Constructivism and Liberalism within the field of International Relations. 
First School: Diaspora as Passive Actors. This is the traditional perspective of a 
diaspora’s role. Under this model, the diaspora identifies with a state or proto-state and acts 
on behalf of its host or kin country either unilaterally or more often, at the direction of the 
kin country (Figure 1). 
                                                 
9 Mercy A. Kuo, “China’s United Front Work: Propaganda as Policy,” The Diplomat, February 14, 2018, 
https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/chinas-united-front-work-propaganda-as-policy/?allpages=yes&print=yes. 
10 Olivier Brault, “The Chinese Diaspora: China’s Instrument of Power?” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced 
Air and Space Studies, 2010). 




Figure 1. Kin Country-Driven Diasporic Influence Model  
Charles King and Neil Melvin, in “Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign 
Policy, and Security in Linkage,” suggest that only diasporas holding strong “ethnic 
identity and communal solidarity” with their ancestral homelands can be leveraged by their 
kin country to influence the host country. He drew case studies from the post-Soviet states 
of Ukraine and Kazakhstan and concluded that the lack of a distinct ethnic identity in these 
states’ diaspora communities explain the minor role diaspora politics played in the region 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 12  On the opposite end, Adamson observes that 
authoritarian states often forcefully control their overseas diaspora communities to expand 
the state’s power beyond national borders.13  
Under this school of thought, a second scenario involves a host country leveraging 
the diaspora to influence its kin country’s domestic politics (Figure 2). This is perhaps best 
illustrated when the U.S. government reached out to its elite Iraqi diaspora to select Ahmed 
                                                 
12 Charles King and Neil J. Melvin, “Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy, and Security in 
Eurasia,” International Security 24, No. 3 (Winter, 1999–2000): 132. 




Chalabi, a prominent member of the exiled Iraqi diaspora, to be the political leader of the 
Post-Saddam Iraq.  
 
Figure 2. Host Country-Driven Diasporic Influence Model  
For both passive models, the diaspora is a potent option to exert political influence 
on the global stage, particularly for a weaker nation-state that has yet to possess a robust 
public diplomacy arsenal. A mobilized diaspora, in turn, can promote its kin country’s 
interests abroad, forming powerful lobbying groups. Unsurprisingly, Adamson noted, that 
state, proto-state, and non-state actors have fiercely competed for the “control of the 
diaspora”14 (Figure 3). 
                                                 




Figure 3. Competitive Influence Model 
Second School: Diaspora as an Active Actor. Under this model, a diaspora acts 
on its own initiative and mobilizes unilaterally without explicit directive from either the 
kin or host country. Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth attributed this growing diaspora 
assertiveness to their accumulated wealth and resources in the host countries. As such, a 
diaspora has the potential to even surpass the power status of the elites within its kin or 
host state. The formidable Jewish lobbyists in the U.S., for example, not only can influence 
their host country’s foreign policy but also maintains “political proxies” at home to 
pressure Israel’s domestic politics.15 The Tamil diaspora who sympathized with the rebel 
cause is another example of a powerful self-mobilized diaspora group that was able to 
impact the politics in both their home and kin country via an aggressive fundraising and 
social awareness campaign.16 
Shain and Barth’s active diaspora model has certainly benefited from the 
communication technology advancements of the 21st Century. Indeed, Aihwa Ong argues 
                                                 
15 Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, “Diaspora and International Relations Theory,” International Organization 57, 
no. 3 (Summer 2003): 454. 
16 Camilla Orjuela,”Distant warriors, distant peace workers? Multiple diaspora roles in Sri Lanka’s violent 
conflict,” Global Networks 8, no. 4 (October 2008): 436–452. 
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that today’s diaspora, armed with the power of the internet, can mobilize an unprecedented 
level of public support in response to political events of significance—all in real time. As 
such, globalization and online opinion forums have enabled the emergence of a new 
transnational class of diaspora who are united by their shared ethno-cultural background 
and often operate without explicit state-affiliation. This new “Cyberpublic” has become an 
independent stakeholder alongside traditional state and non-state actors in international 
relations theory (Figure 4). The series of protests against the global anti-Chinese riots in 
Indonesia in 1998 is an excellent example of a “stateless” diaspora online movement 
organized by transnational elites of the same ethnicity in reaction to a certain world event. 
Nevertheless, the rise of this new class is not without its perils. The moral and political 
dilemma derived from a Cyberpublic is accountability—who will be held responsible for 
the constructive as well as destructive effects of their actions?17  
 
Figure 4. Diaspora-Driven Influence Model 
 
                                                 
17 Aihwa Ong, “Cyberpublics and Diaspora Politics Among Transnational Chinese,” Interventions 5, no. 1 
(2003): 97, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13698032000049815. 
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5. Western Academic Views on the Chinese Diaspora’s Political 
Influence 
While ample amounts of literature exist on the Chinese diaspora, academic research 
focusing specifically on its political influence both abroad and at home is surprisingly 
limited. Stephen Fitzgerald’s China and the Oversea Chinese (1972) was perhaps the 
earliest and most comprehensive study on the Chinese diaspora’s influence around the 
world. Since then, qualitative studies by Western and Chinese scholars alike tend to 
generalize Chinese diaspora politics as one sub-category under the PRC’s “public 
diplomacy,” with the sole purpose of advancing a positive international image. This 
academic trend is an intuitive reflection of the observable PRC soft power strategy at the 
time. Up to that point, the CCP leadership had primarily directed considerable resources to 
improve its cultural appeal to the Western audience.  
Yet, this singular focus by Western academics also precludes any critical 
consideration of the Chinese diaspora’s other potentials. For example, researchers from 
AidData and William & Mary College conducted a comprehensive quantitative analysis of 
China’s public diplomacy and its good neighbor effects in 2018. Among the many 
interesting findings, the research reveals that the PRC might be leveraging the positive 
image of its diaspora to improve the host country’s perception of China.18 Nevertheless, 
the study did not pursue this topic further. The authors focused solely on empirical datasets 
pertaining to public diplomacy in the official capacity at the national level rather than the 
informal diasporic activities at the grass-roots level. This research will attempt to address 
this gap by highlighting the process under which the Chinese diaspora’s favorability could 
spill over to boost the favorability of China itself, akin to a “Goodwill Ambassador” effect.  
6. The Metamorphosis of Chinese Diaspora Identity in the Digital Age 
There is one area of consensus between the general diaspora literature and Chinese 
diaspora-specific studies—the transformative effect of information and communication 
                                                 
18 Samantha Custer et al., Ties That Bind: Quantifying China’s public diplomacy and its “good neighbor” effect 




technologies (ICT) on the diaspora’s influence. Scholars such as Sheng Ding have 
highlighted the PRC’s increasing reliance on the internet and social media to deliver an 
appealing state narrative abroad. Beijing’s targeted audience, perhaps unsurprisingly, has 
predominantly been the overseas Chinese diaspora. In this respect, Ding’s “Chinese Digital 
Diaspora in the age of China’s Rise” bears striking resemblance to Ong’s trans-border 
“Cyberpublic”—both suggesting that the emergence of online ethnic communities has 
enabled the diaspora to swiftly traverse between their dual identities as a citizen of their 
host country and a notional one in their kin country.19 The implication of this digital 
fluidity is that the diaspora’s viewpoint can quickly assimilate into its host country’s 
mainstream narrative, all beneath the seams of the cyber realm’s non-attributional nature.  
The topic of Chinese diaspora identity in the digital age was further explored in 
Jajie Lu’s recent study. He concludes that the PRC has been ineffective in influencing the 
Chinese diaspora’s digital identity. Instead, Lu believes that the Chinese diaspora cannot 
simply be tied to a singular persona that is merely an extension of the predominant ethnicity 
in the PRC. The overseas Chinese have in fact developed a distinct identity with its own 
internal divisions and conflicts. Nevertheless, Lu’s study must be taken in context. He 
primarily studied the diasporic Chinese in Australia who may have previously emigrated 
from overseas Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia, thus further diluting their 
identity as mainland Chinese.20  
One particular aspect of Lu’s study that this research will further ascertain is the 
existence of a heterogeneous identity in the Chinese digital diaspora, and Chinese migrant 
communities in general. This thesis will specifically examine the diaspora identities 
divided along the temporal line of emigration—whether there is a generational factor that 
erodes away a diaspora’s sense of Chinese nationalism. This nuance would undoubtedly 
affect the PRC’s influence strategy abroad. 
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Our research also draws on existing studies of Chinese state media’s influence in 
the digital age. The emergence of ICT and its implications for China have spurred a distinct 
series of Western academic research in recent years. The prevailing platforms that these 
studies focus on are the popular social media services such as Facebook, Twitter, or its 
Chinese analogue, Weibo. In 2018, Joyce Nip and Chao Sun at the University of Sydney 
conducted a comprehensive study of the influence of Chinese news media on international 
social media. They examined the popularity of the three largest Chinese state media 
conglomerates—Xinhua, People’s Daily, and CGTN—based on the number of replies 
and retweets of their news feeds from average Twitter users around the world.21 The study 
reveals that Chinese state media has established a steady foothold in the social media space 
and is quite successful in gaining an international following. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Nip 
and Sun also reach the conclusion that Chinese media accounts on Twitter are largely an 
extension of the Party’s one-way propagation system. The fact that over 60% of their news 
tweets are dedicated to China-related content ensures that Chinese state media’s viewpoints 
will dominate international narratives pertaining to the PRC in the digital age. And true to 
its communist propaganda origins, the PRC’s social media presence is focused on 
outcompeting Western narratives. Big data analysis suggests that the PRC might be quite 
successful at achieving this goal. For instance, Chinese state media outlets were ranked 
amongst the most active and most retweeted accounts for all information pertaining to the 
South China Sea dispute during the study’s reporting period.22 
Nip and Sun’s study is important to our study in a more fundamental way—it 
categorically establishes the Chinese state media as a soft power venue via which the PRC 
attempts to enhance its appeal. Referring back to the trilateral model, we can now 
confidently add Chinese state media as an enabler in the flow of influence between the kin 
country and host country. 23  We build upon Nip and Sun’s study by adding a third 
component—the Chinese diaspora communities—to determine whether they facilitate or 
                                                 
21 Joyce Nip and Chao Sun, “China’s News Media Tweeting, Competing with U.S. Sources,” Westminister 
Papers in Communication and Culture 13, no. 1 (2018): 98–122. 
22 Nip and Sun, “China’s News Media Tweeting, Competing with U.S. Sources,” 98–122. 
23 Nip and Sun, “China’s News Media Tweeting, Competing with U.S. Sources,” 98–122. 
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hamper the flow of influence from the Chinese media to the host countries. Moreover, as 
Nip and Sun’s research methodology have aptly validated, social media services, such as 
Twitter, are indeed an effective measure for the level of influence in the age of ICT. This 
study’s research methodology will adopt a similar approach.  
7. Illuminating the PRC’s Methods for Conducting Diaspora Politics 
The academic references examined thus far are based mainly on Western research. 
What has the PRC government disclosed vis-a-vis its own methods and approach to 
diaspora politics? The inherently opaque nature of the PRC’s inner political workings 
implies that official publications on this topic are sparse. Perhaps the most revealing 
statement came from the PRC’s Political Work Guidelines of the People’s Liberation 
Army” in 2003, four years prior to the official adoption of Hu’s “Soft Power with Chinese 
characteristics.” In this white paper, the CCP for the first time outlined a three-pronged 
approach known as the “Three Warfare”（三战论）campaign to influence Western 
audiences. Each prong represents a focus, to include media, public opinion, and sense of 
legality. For “Media Warfare,” the PRC seeks to establish narrative dominance in popular 
foreign media. For “Public Opinion Warfare,” the Party aims to sway the opinion of foreign 
audiences to align closer with the PRC’s strategic objectives. Lastly, and perhaps most 
importantly, “Legality Warfare” entails securing legitimacy for the PRC’s narrative not 
only de jure but also de facto in the eyes of the target audience. In implementation, each 
focus of the Three Warfare concept is intrinsically related, if not interdependent, to one 
another. Media dominance could easily produce a favorable narrative, which in turn, sways 
public opinion and propels certain popular views into the mainstream political circle. 
Unfortunately, no additional government literature on the Three Warfare concept 
has been published since 2003. Yet, it is clear the Chinese leadership has adhered to this 
construct to some extent in carrying out its foreign policy in recent years. The most 
indicative example was in 2013–2015 during the South China Sea dispute, when the PRC 
ostensibly waged a “legality” campaign via mass and social media to establish historical 
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legitimacy in its claim over the Scarborough Islands.24 One critical information gap in the 
understanding of the Three Warfare concept is the identity of the “operators,” or the agents 
operating on behalf of the PRC and carrying out the influencing act itself. In this function, 
a large ethnic Chinese diaspora community, with an established access and social prestige 
in the host country, could certainly be the prime candidate to serve in this capacity. Limited 
academic research in this area precludes us from validating this hypothesis. This study aims 
to fill in this gap. 
8. Summary of Gaps in the Current Literature 
In assessing the current literature holistically, we observed a series of knowledge 
gaps that upon addressing could significantly illuminate the logic and methods of diaspora 
politics in the age of mass and social media. First, has today’s diaspora politics transformed 
beyond the traditional active vs. passive framework in the era of social media? Is the active 
vs. passive distinction still relevant? Can a state actor take advantage of the inherently 
amorphous and non-attributional characteristics of today’s “Cyberpublic” to carry out a 
traditional influence campaign against the host country? 
In other words, can a rising power, such as the PRC, intentionally blur the line 
between active and passive diaspora politics in order to create the façade of a seemingly 
“legitimate” domestic voice within the host country?  Answers to these questions would 
enable U.S. policymakers to develop appropriate responses against revisionist states 
currently leveraging diaspora politics to erode U.S. political influence. Moreover, an 
improved situational awareness of the existing influence channels will improve the U.S.’s 
ability to tap into the wealth of diaspora resources abroad in furthering its own national 
interest. 
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III. THEORIZING CHINESE INFLUENCE STRATEGY ABROAD 
This thesis is designed to answer the following research question: how and to what 
extent has the PRC been able to leverage the strength of its state media infrastructure and 
the overseas Chinese diaspora to promulgate its narratives on the global stage? This chapter 
addresses the first part of the research question—the “how” behind Beijing’s ability to 
leverage. The essence of this question is one of forms and functions; this is best answered 
by a synthesis of available literature on the known theoretical framework of Chinese 
influence strategy in the age of mass and social media.  
A. NATION BRANDING—THE GOAL OF BEIJING’S SOFT POWER 
STRATEGY 
Chinese influence activities, ranging from benign cultural exchanges to more 
portentous attempts at fostering economic dependency, generally fall under the so-called 
“Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics” strategy that was discussed above in the 
literature review. President Hu Jintao first unveiled the Communist Party’s reinterpretation 
of Joseph Nye’s soft power theory in 2007, which Hu’s successor Xi Jinping carried 
forward with even greater zeal. The explicit goal of the PRC’s soft power strategy is to 
increase both its physical and cognitive appeal to an international audience; or as one 
American scholar keenly observed—to promote China’s international image as one would 
when “branding” a popular commercial product. In other word, the attraction of the China 
brand is based on its positive reputation and perceived trustworthiness; both are necessary 
to build brand loyalty.25 
The question for scholars is thus via which means and in what ways can Beijing’s 
soft power strategy promote its national name brand around the world. We hypothesize that 
this occurs through the growing strength of the PRC’s state media abroad as well as the 
expansive influence of its ethnic Chinese diaspora. The answer to the latter—the 
mechanism of national branding—is the conventional wisdom that a well-respected 
                                                 
25 Sheng Ding, “Digital Diaspora and National Image Building: A New Perspective on Chinese Diaspora Study 
in the Age of China’s Rise,” Pacific Affairs 80, no. 4 (Winter 2007/2008): 631. 
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diaspora community can successfully amplify and promote its kin country’s media 
narrative to the host country’s general population. 
 
Figure 5. PRC Overseas Influence Framework (Hypothesized) 
But the challenge for the PRC is that its diaspora is not as an easily malleable group 
as conventional wisdom has led us to believe. The 65 million-strong overseas Chinese is 
not only the largest diaspora in the world, but also amongst the richest and most 
influential.26 Yet, the group is by no means homogenous and indeed has developed its own 
identity that could oppose the CCP on certain issues. Simply put, it is an unlikely scenario 
that the diaspora communities would unanimously amplify Beijing’s narratives in all 
instances without external influence. Therefore, the first hurdle that Beijing must overcome 
is to manage its diaspora, or at least to minimize dissension within its ranks. 
This chapter will provide the theoretical framework for understanding how the PRC 
state media are able to not only influence the powerful diaspora communities to support 
Beijing’s view but also to enhance the China name brand in their respective host countries. 
Our discussion will focus particularly on Beijing’s management style in dealing with the 
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emerging digital diaspora that transcends physical borders. Figure 5 depicts an 
interpretation of the Chinese influence campaign framework—a playbook of a sort—which 
will be detailed in the following sections.  
B. REVISITING DIASPORA POLITICS FROM MAO TO XI  
The ethnic Chinese diaspora has played a quiet yet pivotal role in the rapid 
modernization of China since Deng’s reforms and his opening up policy (改革开放). The 
diaspora helped jump-start the People’s Republic of China’s bourgeoning economy via 
direct investment during the initial reform years, and Beijing continued to call on these 
“Patriotic Chinese Diaspora Communities” (爱国华侨) to lobby on behalf of their ancestral 
home. The Party’s reliance on the ethnic Chinese abroad should not come as a surprise—
after all, the approach was clearly in line with Mao’s policy of “leveraging civil actors to 
persuade the politicians; civil sector will take the first step” (“以民促官, 民间先行”), which 
contributed to the monumental thawing of Sino-Japan relations in the 1970s. In that 
particular episode, the “civil actors” the Chairman referred to were predominantly ethnic 
Chinese communities residing in Tokyo.27 Since then, this policy has produced similarly 
successful results in breaking China out of its international isolation. Under Xi’s tutelage, 
the importance of the diaspora has once again been elevated into the spotlight. In the now 
famous “Chinese Dream” speech in 2017, Xi ostensibly proclaimed “The realization of the 
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation requires the joint efforts of Chinese sons and 
daughters at home and abroad (“實現中華民族偉大復興，需要海內外中華兒女共同努力”). This 
speech proves to be the harbinger of a renewed effort to gain the support of a new 
generation of millennial Chinese overseas. 
1. Defining the Chinese Diaspora in Modern History  
A brief discussion is due on the evolving definition of the Chinese diaspora. Similar 
to Sheng Ding, Dudley Poston, and Juyin Wong’s interpretations, we take a broad approach 
                                                 




to categorize Chinese diaspora as “persons of Chinese ancestry that reside outside the PRC 
or Taiwan”.28 It is worth noting the term Chinese diaspora or “Huaqiao” (华侨 ) was 
originally meant to describe only those Chinese who are living overseas but have retained 
their Chinese citizenship. Recently, however, this term has increasingly become 
synonymous with Chinese ethnicity, “Huayi” (华裔), or any person of Chinese lineage, 
“Huaren” (华人 ) in academic journals. 29  Under this broad interpretation, the Chinese 
diaspora includes both the new immigrants (those born in PRC who might have yet to 
obtain citizenship of their host country) and the older and more established immigrants 
whose progeny migrated generations earlier. The blurring distinction between Huaren and 
Huaqiao may actually benefit the PRC’s narrative, as the party can now legitimately appeal 
to the shared “Chinese-ness” of both new and old generations of immigrants in support of 
the rejuvenation of their kin country. 
Scholars usually divide the history of Chinese migration into two periods: before 
and after the year 1952. The outward flow of Chinese people from mainland China has 
been occurring for centuries, reaching its peak during the latter half of the 19th Century 
when waves of impoverished Chinese emigrants rushed westward to seek employment as 
manual laborers in their newly adopted homelands. In particular, the “Coolie Trade” 
witnessed a high demand in cheap Chinese indentured servants to replace the African 
slaves after the abolition of slavery in Britain and the U.S. The migration trend gradually 
tapered going into the first half of the 20th Century and essentially halted in 1952. This 
watershed year marked the beginning of Mao’s strict prohibition on outmigration that 
lasted for the next three decades. This policy was later reversed by Deng as part of his 
“Open-Door Policy.” Migration volume then began to climb as more than half of the 
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Chinese students studying abroad opted to stay behind after graduation. Scholars have often 
characterized this post-Deng rebound as the second migration peak in China’s history.30  
Looking at the latest migration period, several key trends emerged. First, the 
majority of the emigrants now come from mainland China as oppose to Taiwan or Hong 
Kong (an increase from 58.5% to 74.5% in the U.S. since 1989).31 Secondly, emigrants 
from this period are highly educated, possessing many professional skills critical to 
sustaining their host countries’ economies.32 These trends, in turn, afford Beijing with new 
opportunities for positive representation—conveniently aligning with its overall national 
branding efforts.33 Nevertheless, in order to effectively realize the full potential of the 
diaspora’s 65-million members as Beijing’s instrument, a correspondingly robust state 
infrastructure must be in place to interact with the diaspora. 
2. Evolution of Beijing’s State Apparatus for Diaspora Affairs 
Since its founding, the PRC has always invested heavily in Diaspora Affairs (侨务工
作 ) with specialized agencies assigned to carry out its engagement with the overseas 
Chinese communities. During the Cold War era, these responsibilities fell on ideology-
centric agencies such as the United Front Work Department (UFWD), International Liaison 
Department, Propaganda (or “Publicity”) Department, and the PLA Second Department. 
For Mao, the Chinese diaspora was integral to the global proliferation of his revolutionary 
ideas. Diaspora affairs during this period therefore generally had implicit objectives to 
foment leftist rebellions around the world.  
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Beijing’s approach to diaspora affairs changed dramatically in 1989. In the 
aftermath of the Tiananmen Square Massacre when China’s international standing 
plummeted, the Party shifted to a more constructive model—with diaspora now viewed as 
“propaganda bases” to repair China’s damaged international image. It was during this 
period, that the State Council’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO, 国务院侨务办公室) 
began taking over much of the diaspora affairs responsibilities from the ideology-centric 
agencies to match with this paradigm shift.34 
In the early 2000s, a series of high profile Western academic studies brought the 
world’s attention to the Chinese diaspora’s significant contribution to the global economy. 
One work’s regression model, for example, found that an additional 10% of population in 
ethnic Chinese category translates to nearly a one percent increase in the host country’s 
GDP.35 These revelations compelled Beijing to rethink once again its approach to diaspora 
affairs. As such, the Overseas Chinese Office undertook an aggressive campaign to engage 
the ethnic Chinese business leaders around the world—in hope of leveraging the diaspora’s 
newfound economic attractiveness to access mainstream foreign audiences. 
In recent years with Xi in power, analysts have noticed signs of yet another change 
in Beijing’s approach to diaspora affairs. In March of 2018, the PRC announced that the 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Office will regroup under the purview of the United Front Work 
Department (UFWD). This reshuffle shifted the pendulum closer to the earlier party/
ideology-dominant model—perhaps not to the extent of active subversion as during the 
Cold War, but certainly a more assertive approach to engage, guide, and if necessary, 
coerce the diaspora community to do its bidding .36 37 Scholars have speculated that this 
recent move might not only be a reflection of Xi’s nationalistic rhetoric but also due to 
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political survivability. Xi’s vision for China is not without its critics, and dissidents abound 
particularly overseas. This brings up an importance characteristic of the diaspora 
community for the next discussion—its inherently contested nature that could pose a 
challenge to Beijing’s legitimacy. 
C. BEIJING’S APPROACH TO INFLUENCING AUDIENCES ABROAD 
1. United Front Work Department—Building a Pro-Beijing Coalition 
Aside from improving China’s image abroad, are there other incentives for China 
to engage its diaspora? Some scholars suspect a more existential rationale. A vibrant 
diaspora population could espouse a rival narrative alongside the Party’s ideology that 
could easily gain international approval, if not by proximity of the source alone. Worse, 
these narratives could creep back into China and win over the support of its population, 
directly challenging the legitimacy of the CCP. One does not need to look far into China’s 
history to understand the threat posed by a dissident diaspora community. The founding 
members of Tongmeng Hui (同盟会，Pre-cursor to KMT) and key cadres of the later 
Chinese Communist Party belonged to the ethnic Chinese diaspora and became radicalized 
abroad. The cataclysmic Wuchang Revolution (武昌起义) that brought down the last emperor 
of China in 1911 was orchestrated and financed largely by diaspora communities abroad. 
More recently, in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, the widespread protest 
from the diaspora communities was a disquieting reminder for the Party of a potential 
repeat of history. 38 The PRC’s goal in engaging with the diaspora, therefore, entails 
“managing” if not outright “controlling” the diaspora’s voices. The organization that is at 
the forefront to fulfill this role is none other than the UFWD. 
To better understand UFWD’s role in controlling diaspora dissidents, we must first 
examine its role in the broader context of China’s influence operations abroad. Scholars 
widely agree that the PRC’s influence operations fall under the “External  
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Propaganda” (对外宣传) umbrella.39 As seen in Figure 5, this is depicted as two broad yet 
mutually supported efforts—first, building a Pro-Beijing coalition abroad via the UFWD 
and second, conducting strategic messaging via PRC-endorsed media outlets. This section 
will focus the discussion on the former. The concept of United Front (统一战线) is inspired 
by the Leninist theory to “unite all forces that can be united” to “thwart enemy forces 
abroad.”40  Beijing has traditionally employed the United Front strategy both domestically 
and internationally to consolidate its base of power. According to a recent Congressional 
Staff Research report, at the national level, the United Front strategy is guided by the CCP’s 
Politburo Standing Committee and coordinated via the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference which regularly brings together relevant stakeholders in the 
influence campaign. At the operational level, the department’s methods of influence consist 
of establishing official or semi-official organizations as well as co-opting compatible non-
official entities to promote the Party’s agenda.41  
While China has euphemistically labeled its United Front activities as part of its 
soft power, Western analysts remain skeptical. A report by the National Endowment for 
Democracy in 2017 cynically termed China’s UFWD efforts as “Sharp” powers—hiding 
behind a benign appearance and “innocuously sounding language” but backed by the threat 
of hard power to achieve the Party’s political objectives.42 The importance of UFWD was 
reaffirmed recently when Xi Jinping referred to UFWD as China’s “magic  
                                                 
39 Mercy A. Kuo, “China’s United Front Work: Propaganda as Policy,” The Diplomat, February 14, 2018, 
https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/chinas-united-front-work-propaganda-as-policy/?allpages=yes&print=yes. 
40 Alexander Bowe, “China’s Overseas United Front Work,” US-China Economic and Security Commission Staff 
Research Report, August 24, 2018, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/
China%27s%20Overseas%20United%20Front%20Work%20%20Background%20and%20Implications%20for%20US
_final_0.pdf. 
41 Alexander Bowe, “China’s Overseas United Front Work,” https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/
China%27s%20Overseas%20United%20Front%20Work%20%20Background%20and%20Implications%20for%20US
_final_0.pdf. 
42 Marcel Angliviel de la Beaumelle, “The United Front Work Department: ‘Magic Weapon’ at Home and 




weapon” (法) to expand political influence abroad.43 Under Xi’s supervision, the UFWD 
has added an additional 40,000 employees and, as mentioned, now has direct control over 
the Overseas Chinese Bureau.44 
The dual lines of effort in the PRC’s general influence operations also translate to 
its relationship with the diaspora communities. Along the first line, UFWD has unilaterally 
established as well as co-opted thousands of chapters of Beijing-aligned organizations 
around the world. An example in the unilateral category includes PRC fronts such as 
“Peaceful Reunification Societies”; an example of a co-opted organization is the ubiquitous 
Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSA) on major campuses around the world 
that receives funding and maintains tacit ties with the nearest Chinese consulates. The 
message of ethnic unity is the purported motivation behind these organizations—as Beijing 
exploits the ongoing trend of conflating Chinese diaspora (Huaqiao, 华侨) with persons of 
Chinese lineage (Huaren, 华人). Another interpretation of this is that Beijing is attempting 
to transform an inherently heterogeneous diaspora into a more homogenous group.  
Once the diaspora communities are co-opted to the side of the PRC, this newly 
united front could then turn to promoting PRC-favored viewpoints, while stifling 
dissenting views—such as those that promotes Taiwan or Tibet’s independence, protection 
for Falun Gong members, or awareness of the oppression of Uyghur populations. In 
confronting these contested issues, scholars have noted the PRC’s strategy of tuning up the 
volume to overwhelm the opposition, or as Anne-Marie Brady describes, “to make the 
Party’s voice the loudest of them all.”45 
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2. State Media—Propagating Beijing’s Global Narrative 
This strategy of using mass to overwhelm dissenting views is also visible in the 
second line of effort of Beijing’s influence strategy; the PRC has been aggressively 
expanding its global media reach to stifle out the voices of the few independent diaspora 
outlets. For example, PRC-sponsored Chinese Central Television (CCTV, 央视) has rapidly 
expanded its international presence with the establishment of Chinese Global Television 
(CGTV), providing 24-hour broadcasts and low-cost media content to over 100 countries 
with a steady viewership of at least 85 million people. Similar patterns of international 
expansion are also visible in the PRC’s other two state media enterprises, Xinhua News 
(新华社) and People’s Daily (人民日报). The intent is to saturate international audience and 
diaspora alike with PRC-endorsed narratives. 
Anne-Marie Brady has characterized this media expansion as an attempt to 
integrate, or “harmonize,” diaspora mass media with the PRC’s official media narratives—
a strategy known as 海外华文媒体融合 or haiwai huawen meiti ronghe. Beijing’s voice could 
then become representative of all ethnic Chinese people around the world. She further 
noted that this strategy could also create a seemingly favorable domestic voice from within 
the host country itself, providing the PRC’s narrative that much more credence to 
mainstream audiences abroad. Concurrently, the Party has made a concerted effort to 
diversify its media output beyond traditional domains and into the cyber realm, particularly 
the social media platform where great potential and even greater challenges are presented 
to Beijing. 
D. BEIJING AND THE EMERGING DIGITAL DIASPORA 
Thus far, the discussion of Beijing’s influence has been focused on a physical 
population, but do these strategies also apply to the emerging digital populations? A review 
of the available literature strongly suggests that some of Beijing’s influence strategies have 
dual applicability for both the physical and cyber realm. 
Since the 2000s, with the democratization of information and communication 
technologies (ICT), diaspora communities have increasingly turned to online public forums 
to reaffirm their identity, voice their political opinions, and even mobilize for collective 
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action. This new “digital diaspora” transcends borders and has grown in both legitimacy 
and power. For the Chinese diaspora, similar discourse took shape in the formation of a 
“Cyberpublic”—the best example was the Global Huaren Online (全球华人网) movement in 
1998 against the anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia. In describing this episode, Aihwa Ong 
highlighted how the movement was able to unite and mobilize the Chinese diaspora across 
the entire Southeast Asia region with frightening speed and intensity, all allegedly without 
the encouragement from any state actor.46 Ding similarly concluded that “the more China 
engages in globalization … the more important is the role played by the Chinese digital 
diaspora in Chinese politics and foreign policy.” He credited the borderless nature of the 
cyber realm for eroding away the separation amongst “mainland Netizens, Taiwan 
Netizens, American Chinese Netizens, etc.” Instead, he observed “in the virtual world, all 
of them belong to one family”—creating a new diasporic digital nationalism.47 
Yet the rise of the Chinese digital diaspora also presents a double-edged sword. On 
the one hand, the digital diaspora seems to precipitate Beijing’s desire to create a singular 
Chinese identity. On the other, the digital diaspora could endanger the Party—as the 
inherent anonymity in the western cyber realm render it impervious to coercion. The 
example of the Global Huaren Online Movement demonstrates that without positive 
control, similar movements could mobilize an unprecedented number of ethnic Chinese 
people potentially against the Communist government. While literature remains scarce on 
the PRC’s techniques in managing the social media space abroad, one can make a 
reasonable inference from Beijing’s cyber policy for its own netizens within the confines 
of its border. 
Recent research by Gary King and Jennifer Pan has illuminated Beijing’s strategy 
for shaping the domestic cyber realm for its desired narrative. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, the Party avoids outright censorship whenever possible, and instead, opts for 
“astroturfing”—fabricating a large amount (estimated to be 448 million annually) of pro-
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PRC commentaries—to overwhelm public discussion forums. Likewise, Beijing’s hired 
online commentators, known colloquially as the “50-cent Party” (五毛党), dodge direct 
confrontations with dissenting views.  
Scholars surmise that Party leadership understands basic human psychology—the 
more a state attacks the opposition, the more it fuels the opposition’s desire to defend its 
position. Instead, the 50-cent Party’s preferred modus operandi is cheerleading the Party’s 
narrative or creating distractions for the online public with increased coverage of less-
threatening topics.48 Here, a parallel pattern has emerged. The techniques of astroturfing, 
cheerleading, and distraction are all in line with the general influence techniques of 
“making PRC’s voice the loudest of them all” and using mass to overwhelm dissenting 
views. Indeed, similar techniques are allegedly being employed against the Taiwanese 
cyber space leading up to its recent elections.49 
Given the comparatively less restrictive nature of Western cyberspace, one can 
reasonably assume that Beijing’s influence techniques inside China likely extend abroad 
and the general strategy to manage and control the physical diaspora also applies to the 
digital ones.  
E. THE PRC’S USE OF COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA TO 
MANIPULATE THE SOCIAL MEDIA COMMUNITY 
The topic of Chinese usage of online “bots” to influence popular sentiment requires 
a separate discussion. Various academics have charged the Communist state for its attempts 
at using these “bots,” or fake online user accounts operating on the basis of computer codes 
and posing as a human user to interact with other members of the online community. Many 
academic researchers have coined China’s use of bots with the term “computational 
propaganda” to describe the PRC and other authoritarian governments’ activities involving 
                                                 
48 Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Robert, “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media for 
Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument,” American Political Science Review 111, no. 3 (2017): 496–497. 
49 Josh Rogin, “China’s Interference in the 2018 Elections Succeeded – In Taiwan,” The Washington Post, 




automated social media accounts that are associated with specific narratives.50 Consider 
the speed at which communication technologies has evolved and its relatively fresh impact 
on political discourse, few academic research has been done on the topic of computational 
propaganda; nevertheless, due to its headline grabbing tendency, this topic has made 
increasing frequent appearances in academic journals recently.  
 Most academics would agree that China’s use of bots to manipulate discussions in 
the online community is primarily focused on political matters. In Tibet, China has used 
bots to drown out sovereignty movements. Tibetan sympathizers have noticed that Twitter 
hashtags such as #tibet and #freetibet are constantly bombarded with junk tweets from 
automated Twitter accounts. The result of which deemed the hashtags as unusable to track 
the ongoing discussion on the Tibet independence movement. When it comes to political 
movements, protests or security issues, China has been known to intervene using 
computational propaganda to not only demobilize those online discussions but also to 
inundate the online space with pro-government messages.51 In this way, we are seeing a 
repeat of the tactic of “tuning up the volume to drown out the dissidents” as discussed in 
the previous section. On Sina Weibo, one China’s most popular social media platforms, 
researchers found that 13% of messages had been deleted to crack down on those that were 
“too politically charged.”52 With its draconian control over the internet and its domestic 
social media platforms, the PRC government and CCP uses whatever means necessary to 
control and manipulate its domestic online discussions to protect its core national security 
interests—namely, countering threats to its sovereignty and CCP-rule.  
 Despite some research indicating the use of automation to manipulate social media, 
other studies indicate that the PRC government’s bot use may not be as pervasive. 
According to a study by Bolsover and Howard in 2019, their analysis of data collected 
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from both Twitter and Weibo social media platforms “indicate that the Chinese state is not 
using automation as part of either its domestic or international propaganda efforts.”53 This 
study defeats previous assumptions that the Chinese government, because of its 
authoritarian power, would undoubtedly be using computational propaganda to manipulate 
social media discussions. Instead, Bolsover and Howard suggest that the reasons why 
China may not be exercising automation in the social media landscape is because of several 
reasons. China’s traditional state media apparatus including CCTV, China Radio 
International, and China Daily have already dominated most of China’s international 
propaganda efforts. China also has a significantly large pool of human resources; therefore, 
manual dissemination of social media content such as through its 50-Cent army may be a 
smarter and more effective strategy. Lastly, automation on platforms such as Twitter may 
not be as effective since information propagates mainly through those users with 
significantly large followings (i.e., celebrities, social media influencers) and not through 
merely individual users.  
 In the end, accounts used by actual humans attempting to manipulate online 
discussions are more common and possibly more effective than the use of bots. According 
to a 2019 report by the Computational Propaganda Research Project, despite bot accounts 
being used in 50 out of 70 countries studied, human-run accounts are more common than 
bot accounts and can better manipulate conversations by posting comments, tweeting, and 
private messaging. With regards to China, the report indicates that China has a high cyber 
troop capacity involving “large numbers of staff, and large budgetary expenditure on 
psychological operations or information warfare.”54 Because of its ability to use real 
people to manipulate social media and less budgetary constraints, China sees less of a need 
to automate its social media manipulation. 
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 Despite advancements in social media technologies, artificial intelligence, and 
ultra-fast computing speeds, the mere size of population of the Communist state may deem 
the use of bots as an ineffective way of manipulating social media conversations. Instead, 
studies suggest that its own 50-Cent army is more capable of traversing the online 
environment in search of conversations detrimental to the CCP’s hold on state power. Since 
the PRC government places less emphasis on using bots to spread propaganda abroad to 
include influencing the ethnic Chinese diaspora, this study’s analysis does not formally 
account for automated social media accounts and deems it negligible in capturing the 
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IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The previous chapter focused on answering the first part of our research question—
“how” was China been able to leverage the strength of its state media infrastructure and 
overseas diaspora to propagate its narratives abroad. We now attempt to answer the second 
part of the question—“to what extent” was China able to leverage the aggregated strength 
of its state media and diaspora. This question is inherently an assessment of effectiveness 
and is best addressed with a combination of quantitative analysis supported by qualitative 
case studies that will be featured in Chapter V and VI, respectively. The following is a brief 
overview of the research methodology to assess the “extent” of state media and diasporic 




Figure 6. Conceptual Visualization of the Hypotheses 
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The quantitative portion of this research will empirically explore the effectiveness 
of the trilateral influence model (consisting of the PRC, host countries, and diaspora) in 
promoting Beijing’s narratives around the world. We have developed a series of hypotheses 
to help gauge the extent of influence that each of the three key stakeholders impart on the 
model. Figure 6 is a conceptual visualization of this trilateral model introduced above. 
Multiple regression models will be used to test the premises behind each of the three 
hypotheses. 
The first hypothesis asserts that the presence of Chinese diaspora communities in 
general increases the saliency of the PRC’s state media narratives in the respective host 
country’s social media space. The expected relationship is that the larger the size of the 
diaspora population, the more pronounced this effect. 
The second hypothesis expands upon the first and further applies this principle to a 
specific demographic within the diaspora communities. We expect that the presence of 
“newer” Chinese immigrants would have a more pronounced effect on the saliency of the 
PRC’s state media within the social media environments of their host countries than the 
presence that the older generations would.  
The third hypothesis will briefly divert from online saliency and apply the diaspora 
theory to mainstream sentiments on social media. We expect that the Chinese diaspora—
through its positive image and symbiotic interactions with the host countries’ population—
can improve the favorability of the PRC and correspondingly decrease the amount of anti-
China sentiments exhibited on mainstream social media of their host countries.  
This last hypothesis is perhaps the most relevant for China watchers, as this study 
will attempt to assess a key premise behind Xi Jinping’s soft power strategy—that overseas 
Chinese are an indispensable national instrument to enhance China’s appeal around the 
world. If this “Chinese Diaspora as Goodwill Ambassador” hypothesis is valid, then we 
should expect to observe a reduction in anti-China rhetoric on social media in countries 
with a comparably large Chinese diaspora population. The rest of this chapter will be 
dedicated to defining the terms in the hypotheses and the methodology used to assess them. 
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B. OPERATIONALIZING OUR KEY VARIABLES 
1. Intra-diaspora Demographics 
As indicated in the previous chapters, this study broadly defines the overseas 
Chinese diaspora as all ethnic Chinese living abroad (海外华裔), to include both the “new” 
and “old” classes of immigrants. The former is defined as the first-generation immigrants 
who have yet to obtain their respective host countries’ citizenship; while the latter are host 
country citizens of ethnic Chinese-descent, including those with lineage tracing back 
generations to the first wave of Chinese immigrants that left Imperial China in the 19th 
Century. This class distinction is pivotal to understanding the PRC’s relations with its 
overseas diaspora in the trilateral model. Conventional knowledge suggests that Chinese 
diaspora communities are generally united by a shared enthusiasm to self-identify with 
their kin country out of an intrinsic sense of nationalism. Hence, nationalism in this sense 
transcends spatially beyond physical borders and even temporally across generations. 
Recent studies, however, have discovered that the new migrants might be more 
inclined than the older generations to support and promote Beijing’s narratives. One 
explanation is that these recent immigrants continue to maintain active ties with their kin 
country thanks to the widely available Chinese-based social media apps such as Weibo and 
WeChat. Furthermore, this tendency to remain “plugged in” to Chinese social media could 
be both a cause and a symptom as to why new immigrants might have more difficulties 
assimilating into their newly adopted homes. At the core of this study is an attempt to 
validate the conjectures on the differing degrees of influences from the “new” and “old” 
generations of Chinese immigrants via our proposed hypotheses. 
2. Chinese Diaspora Netizens: Amplifiers to Beijing’s Messages Abroad?   
To further assess the trilateral influence model, this study seeks to identify the 
trickle-down effect that a more active diaspora would have on the host country itself. 
Scholars, such as Anne-Marie Brady, have long theorized China’s attempt to integrate and 
“harmonize” diaspora mass media with the PRC’s official media narratives, known as  
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海外华文媒体融合 (haiwai huawen meiti ronghe.)55 The goal is to engender a seemingly 
favorable domestic voice from within the host country itself, which could then influence 
the direction of mainstream media discussions. This strategy could explain Chinese state 
media’s rapid expansion abroad in recent years, particularly in diaspora-heavy regions, as 
well as the diversification of its output platforms to reach a new generation of social media-
savvy populations.56  
In this view, the diaspora community can serve as an intermediary linking the 
PRC’s strategic message to the host country population. The trickle-down effect from a 
particularly involved and outspoken diaspora community could therefore be an elevated 
level of mainstream interest—as displayed on traditional and social media—regarding the 
Chinese state media content. It should therefore be possible to gauge the spread of the 
PRC’s strategic messaging by measuring the extent that social media abroad has echoed, 
or even internalized, Chinese state media’s narratives. This is the underlying logic to our 
research’s methodology. 
This research will look beyond traditional mass media platforms such as print and 
television to focus on the online public sphere—specifically, social media as a 
democratized platform where the average citizen has the freedom to access and disseminate 
information almost instantaneously. But beyond the spread of information, social media is 
also becoming the public platform of choice to express individual opinions, and 
consequently, a fitting venue for researchers to identify salient topics to the wider society. 
This research will primarily focus on the latter; and the measure for saliency will be based 
on how frequently a particular narrative has been referenced on social media, regardless of 
the personal sentiments expressed in the original post. For this research, saliency refers to 
the level of public interest in a topic—as measured by the rate of reposting of the original 
content. 
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The particular social media platform this research will explore is the microblogging 
services of Twitter. A microblogging service provides its users with an online space for 
relatively succinct verbal expressions—consisting of short sentences and hashtags—with 
minimal censorship in most free and democratic countries. In the case of Twitter, a user’s 
messages known as “tweets” are restricted to a mere 280 characters. Furthermore, 
microblogs allow users to “retweet” and “repost” another user’s messages. The former 
indicates the reader’s perception of saliency concerning the feed content (equivalent to the 
“forward” function in an email) while the latter suggests an even greater expression which 
includes adding his or her own interpretation to the original feed. Both are excellent 
measurements of the echoing effect on a given topic. 
We will rely on the three most popular Chinese state-run media outlets online, both 
domestically and abroad, as the basis for Beijing’s official narratives. They are the 
following: People’s Daily (人民日报), XinhuaNet (新华网), and Global Times (环球时报). To 
illustrate the global reach of these media outlets, Xinhua News Agency alone, which is the 
Chinese government’s primary mouthpiece, owns 170 foreign bureaus. 57  Its Twitter 
account currently has over 11.7 million followers, virtually all originating outside of China 
since Western social media is censored inside the authoritarian state.58 
C. TRENDING ISSUES: ARE CERTAIN STATE MEDIA NARRATIVES 
MORE POPULAR ON SOCIAL MEDIA?  
We have selected four issues of China’s national interest to isolate and test the 
impact of state media narratives. These issues—known as core interests (核心利益 ) in 
Chinese literature—are Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet, and potentially, the South China Sea 
territorial claims.59 These topics were selected based on their inherently contentious nature 
where in most cases, the host country’s mainstream views could be diametrically opposed 
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to those of the PRC. In contrast, a more benign topic would likely generate minimum 
interest, or debate, even in the absence of PRC media influence. 
We then queried for all online articles related to these issues in the three identified 
Chinese state media sources. Of note, this approach differs from other similar studies in 
the past because our search terms are bilingually coded in both English and Chinese. This 
way, the input of the “new” Chinese immigrants can be incorporated into the overall data 
results. The underlining assumption is that recent immigrants would gravitate more 
towards news content in their native tongue. Finally, we recorded the frequency of these 
state media publications by week from August 1, 2013, to July 31, 2014.  
At this point, an additional control variable composed of an alternative, non-PRC-
sponsored media narrative will need to be introduced. The purpose is to account for the 
competitive informational landscape to which the host country population is likely exposed 
to. This addresses the possibility that the test populations could simply have been 
stimulated by an international event of significance that was equally covered across the 
oceans—and not by the Chinese state media alone. For this reason, the same search criteria 
for China’s core interest issues will be applied to Western media such as CNN and the New 
York Times. 
D. TO TWEET OR NOT TO TWEET: MICRO-BLOGGING AS A GAUGE 
OF CHINESE STATE MEDIA’S SALIENCE 
The last step is to quantify the saliency of the collected media narratives in the host 
country’s social media space. In other words, how much interest was generated by 
Beijing’s state-run media in the host country population? To answer this question, we 
examine a global Twitter database, which contains 10% random sample of all public 
messages sent through the Twitter network over the period August 2013 to July 2014. The 
saliency of Chinese state media contents is measured by the number of “tweets” on state 
media news articles concerning the core issues (based on co-occurrence of state media 
URLs and core issue keywords). These tweets represent not only volume but also the 
popularity of a given narrative. Popularity, of course, need not equate to favorability; it 
merely indicates the extent to which Beijing’s narratives were being circulated in the 
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mainstream discussions on global social media. Concurrently, we can also pinpoint each 
tweet’s country of origin through the “location” profile label and compare this data against 
the greater ethno-geographic map of the Chinese diaspora population. 
None of the variables thus far are sufficient to measure public sentiments on 
Chinese state media narrative. For this, one would require coding for a pre-determined set 
of words commonly associated with the human emotional spectrum. Previous academic 
works on similar topics have resorted to this approach with varying results—the most 
notable of which was the paper by Zhang Yinxian, that measured “nationalism” on 
Chinese-based social media Weibo.60 This study, on the other hand, will take a more 
simplified approach by looking for the occurrences of anti-China hashtags. In recent years, 
several popular anti-China hashtags have become prevalent on Western social media as 
part of the greater backlash against purported Chinese atrocities against Uyghur and Falun 
Gong practitioners. Examples include #ChinaLies and #ShameOnChina. A number of 
Twitter postings with these anti-China hashtags were manually sampled, and they have 
consistently demonstrated unfavorable views towards Beijing. It is reasonable to assume 
that Twitter postings with these anti-China hashtags are most likely to be critical of 
Beijing’s stance. In testing the “Diaspora as Goodwill Ambassadors” hypothesis, one can 
take the relative volume of anti-China hashtags as an indirect indicator of public 
favorability towards China. In countries where anti-China sentiments are strong, one can 
therefore expect to see a correspondingly high level of anti-China hashtags. Conversely, 
societies with milder sentiments towards China should display fewer numbers of the same.  
E. SUMMARY OF EXPECTED REGRESSION RESULTS 
If Hypothesis #1 is correct and the presence of ethnic Chinese diaspora 
communities increases the saliency of Chinese state media narratives in their host 
countries, one would expect to see a statistically significant increase in “tweets” and 
“posts” of Chinese State media narratives from the Twitter users in countries with 
comparably larger Chinese diaspora populations.  
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If Hypothesis #2 is correct and the presence of new immigrants in the Chinese 
diaspora communities are more likely than the older generations to increase the saliency of 
Chinese state media narratives in their host countries, we should expect to see a statistically 
significant increase in “tweets” and “posts” of Chinese state media narratives from the 
Twitter users in countries with comparably larger “new Chinese immigrant” populations.  
If Hypothesis #3 is correct and the presence of Chinese diaspora (both new and old) 
can convey a sense of goodwill to the greater society and improve the favorability of China 
in the eyes of their respective host countries’ mainstream populations, we would expect to 
see a statistically significant decrease in the number of anti-China hashtags from the 
Twitter users in countries with comparably larger ethnic Chinese population. 
F. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 
The qualitative part of this thesis is built upon the quantitative research. This helps 
contextualize our diasporic influence model in a real-world setting. The discussions focus 
on the visible dynamics between the “new” and the “old” classes of Chinese diasporas and 
their relations vis-a-vis the Chinese state media infrastructure in certain regions of interest. 
In doing so, it may be possible to translate the results from the quantitative findings into 
qualitative understanding. By focusing on specific countries and regions, the case studies 
can also illuminate the actual process as it unfolds on the ground via which the Chinese 
state is able to leverage the Chinese diaspora to influence the greater population. 
We have selected Australia and New Zealand as the first set of case studies. 
Australia and New Zealand are both an integral part of the “Five Eyes,” the well-known 
intelligence alliance that also includes the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. 
Australia and New Zealand have also experienced an influx of “new” Chinese immigrants 
from the Mainland in the last decade. Recent security investigations have accentuated the 
deepening PRC influence in Australia and New Zealand’s policymaking apparatus, leading 
some to view certain members of the recent Chinese migrant communities as a risk to the 
sovereignty of these countries. The more relevant question to determine the extent of 
Chinese influence then becomes not the size of the diaspora populations alone—but the 
degree to which these relatively small migrant communities were able to penetrate the 
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greater society at the decisive entry point to induce such a disproportionally significant 
impact. 
Another case study focuses not on a single country but rather the greater region of 
Southeast Asia. Our discussion centers on trends, patterns, and broad observations 
spanning several nation-states in this region. Southeast Asia was selected based on its 
unique diaspora composition and vital strategic importance to the INDO-PACOM Area of 
Responsibility. The region boasts some of the largest Chinese diaspora communities in the 
world—namely, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. Similar to the first set of 
case studies, Southeast Asia has also witnessed an increase in “new” migrants from 
Mainland China, albeit on a much smaller scale. For those interested in geopolitics, the 
region provides an opportunity to explore the “hedging” and “bandwagoning” tendencies 
exhibited by some of its regimes. Most countries in this region have chosen to maintain a 
robust diplomatic relationship with both the U.S. and the PRC in the form of an enduring 
security pact with the former and a bourgeoning economic nexus with the latter. 
Nevertheless, behind this delicate balance lies a deeply contested region. 
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V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND KEY FINDINGS 
The second part of our research question seeks to measure the “extent” to which 
China is able to leverage its state media and diaspora to promote its narratives around the 
world. This question is an assessment of effectiveness; and the degree of effectiveness can 
be translated as the level of saliency of Chinese state media content amongst the 
mainstream social media users abroad. 
A. SPECIFYING THE REGRESSION MODELS 
To ascertain whether the presence of ethnic Chinese diaspora populations can 
indeed affect the saliency of Chinese state media abroad, we sought empirical evidence 
that would connect Chinese diaspora size with the volume of social media postings 
repeating Chinese state media narratives around the world. The evidence, in this case, was 
drawn from a series of regression models utilizing United Nations migrant stock data and 
aggregated micro-blogging records that are publicly available comparing the volume of 
tweeting activities to variation in the size of diaspora population around the world and the 
level of Chinese state media output during the test period.61 Since UN migrant data is 
drawn primarily from national censuses of non-resident migrants, this study referenced 
another dataset from a study by Poston and Wong that captures the populations of both 
residents and citizens of Chinese descent around the world.62 
To further infer sentiments in the micro-blogging data, our analysis examined 
hashtags that unambiguously disclosed the preference of the senders. The popular 
#ChinaLies (#中国谎言) hashtag is a good entry point to estimate anti-China sentiments in 
Twitter communities around the world. If our third and final hypothesis—the presence of 
                                                 
61 United Nations database (object name POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2017; accessed June 22, 2019), 
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/data/
UN_MigrantStockTotal_2017.xlsx. 
62 Dudley L. Poston Jr. and Juyin Helen Wong, “The Chinese Diaspora: The Current Distribution of the Overseas 
Chinese Population,” Chinese Journal of Sociology 2, no. 3 (2016): 348–373. Inclusion of these multiple data sources 
delineating the difference between the “new” and “old” ethnic Chinese immigrants provides more robust explanatory 
strength of the regression models. 
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a large Chinese diaspora would generate goodwill from their host countries towards the kin 
country—is correct, then the evidence should reveal that as the diaspora population size 
increases the volume of anti-China hashtags will correspondingly subside. 
B. QUANTIFYING THE VARIABLES 
The first independent variable, the output from Chinese state media, was measured 
over a one-year period, spanning from August 1, 2013, to July 31, 2014. As mentioned 
previously, the three main state media outlets considered in this study were Xinhua News  
(新华社), People’s Daily (人民日报), and Global Times (环球时报). The specific media platforms 
to be tested were each outlet’s official websites, their direct subsidiaries, and international 
variations on the internet. Ultimately, we included 14 distinct state media URL fragments 
in the search parameter—a testament in itself to the Chinese state media’s rapidly 
expanding global footprint (Figure 7). 
Next, we ran a search across a global online media archive for articles that were 
published by these outlets during the test period—websites that contained the listed state 
media URLs—and counted these outputs by day (Figure 8). A quick glance at the chart 
reveals that aggregated state media output was on a slight upward trend, with rhythmic 
spiking throughout, possibly reflecting occurrences of major news events during the year. 
For instance, the Philippines’ decision to elevate the South Chinese Sea dispute to 
UNCLOS in March of 2014 generated much Chinese state media response. In short, 







Figure 7. List of State Media URLs  
 
Figure 8. Total Output of Chinese State Media during the Test Period 
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To enhance the political relevance of the regression models, we further parsed the 
collected state media data down to China’s core interest issues—Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan, 
and the South China Sea (SCS). Each was coded as its own variable to determine relative 
saliency. Whenever possible, we took a nuanced approach to look for compound key words 
that further qualified the core issue with a political action or stance. For example, the 
parameters were coded to search for articles that not only contained the terms “Taiwan 
Strait” and “Uyghur” but also “Taiwan’s Independence” and “Uyghur Separatist.” By 
seeking out these co-occurrences in the news articles, we attempt to exclude “hits” that 
matched the region of interest but were of only “soft news” value. 
 
Figure 9. News Media Search Terms for Core Issues 
Figure 9 provides a list of the key terms in the search parameter. In addition to 
English, each search term was concurrently coded in Chinese (Simplified and Traditional), 
Korean, and Japanese—the secondary and tertiary languages in which Chinese state media 
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outlets operated parallel websites. Together, test samples taken in these four languages 
represented the dominant linguistic attributes of the vast majority of the host countries 
where the ethnic Chinese diaspora resided in 2014. 
The next step was to generate the second independent variable—the variation in 
ethnic Chinese population size by country during the test period. Here, the analysis further 
distilled the “new migrant” category from the “general diaspora population.” The former 
consisted of students, migrant workers, and short-term residents who have yet to obtain 
their host countries’ citizenships. The latter, as suggested by its title, are inclusive of all 
self-identified ethnic Chinese populations living abroad. This categorical distinction is a 
central argument in the hypotheses in which it is conjectured that “new migrants” are more 
willing to echo Chinese state media and consequently are more effective in increasing the 
overall saliency of Chinese narratives in their host countries’ social media. The 
underpinning logic is that new migrants tend to exhibit a higher degree of loyalty to China 
and are more likely to accept Chinese media at its face value, if not simply due to the 
shorter assimilation period they have experienced in their newly adopted homes. 
Measuring the true influence of the diaspora population, however, is dependent 
upon its context within each country’s ethno-demographic distribution. For instance, a 
diaspora community of twenty thousand would understandably be more influential in a 
country of two million people than the same in a population of two hundred million. Thus, 
each migrant and diaspora population size was measured as a proportion of the total 
population of its respective host countries, creating a standardized set of population data 







Figure 10. Raw Distribution of New Migrant vs. Ethnic Chinese Diaspora 
Figure 10 depicts the raw distribution of “new migrants” versus “general diaspora” 
around the world. The majority of ethnic Chinese diaspora claimed Southeast Asia and 
North America as their permanent residence. The newcomers, however, are heavily 
concentrated in the U.S., Canada, Australia, UK, and Japan. It is noteworthy that the 
distribution of new Chinese migrants also approximately aligned with the destinations of 




Figure 11. Distribution of Chinese Diaspora as a Proportion of Total Population 
 
Figure 12. Distribution of New Chinese Population as a Proportion of Total 
Population  
To further contextualize the data, Figure 11 depicts the distribution of Chinese 
diaspora populations as a proportion of their host countries’ total populations. Here, we see 
that countries in Southeast Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore) have the world’s largest 
proportional share of ethnic Chinese populations living outside China. 
Figure 12 further breaks down the demographic composition by depicting only the 
new Chinese migrant populations as a proportion of their respective host countries’ total 
populations. Comparing Figure 12 with Figure 10, we now see that the largest new Chinese 
migrant populations in relative terms are actually in Canada and Australia, as opposed to 
the U.S. when depicted as raw data. 
The last step was to calculate our dependent variable, the social media posting 
volume in each country. We reasoned that average internet users could easily transfer 
Chinese state media’s online contents to their personal micro-blogging applications such 
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as Twitter. They can either manually copy and paste the URLs or via an embedded Twitter 
“share” button on the articles themselves. As such, the same state media search parameter 
was recycled and re-applied to the Twitter archive. 
The analysis also added to this parameter a set of trending sentiment-specific 
hashtags, to include #ChinaLies (#中国谎言) and its variations. By overlapping these two 
groups of search parameters, we could estimate both the level of “amplification” of Chinese 
state media contents as well as the perceived “favorability” in the Twitter community 
regarding the circulation thereof. The results from each regression model, derived from 




Table 1. Regression Results on State Media Salience and Anti-China Sentiment 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
  
  Tweets on  
State Media Content  Anti-China Hashtags 
 (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) 
Independent Variable 
      
New Migrant Population  0.866*** 0.865*** 0.864*** 1.339*** 1.350*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.107) (0.107) 
      
Chinese Diaspora Population   0.070** 0.070** 0.071** -0.206** -0.211** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.084) (0.084) 
      
Chinese State Media Output (time-lagged) 0.343***  -0.990*** -1.890*** -9.957*** 
 (0.032)  (0.139) (0.078) (0.484) 
 
State Media Output by Core Issue:  
     
- Taiwan (Time-lagged)   0.240***  0.968*** 
   (0.024)  (0.069) 
      
- Tibet (Time-lagged)   0.354***  1.481*** 
   (0.046)  (0.130) 
      
- Xinjiang (Time-lagged)   0.585***  3.316*** 
   (0.054)  (0.188) 
      
- Southeast China (Time-lagged)   0.237***  2.524*** 
   (0.045)  (0.157) 
      
Tweets of State Media Content (Time-lagged)    1.392*** 1.338*** 
    (0.051) (0.051) 
      
World News Media Output (Time-lagged) -0.352***  -0.603*** 0.245 -0.553*** 
 (0.067)  (0.071) (0.163) (0.168) 
      
Anti-China Tweets (Time-lagged)  0.212***    0.203***  0.201***   
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)   
      
Total Tweets (Time-lagged) 1.590*** 1.590*** 1.588*** 0.839*** 0.849*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.062) (0.062) 
      
Total Tweets in Chinese (Time-lagged) 0.898*** 0.896*** 0.895*** 0.319*** 0.311*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.048) (0.048) 
      
Total Tweets in English (Time-lagged) -0.327*** -0.327*** -0.328*** 1.437*** 1.439*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.031) (0.031) 
      




Table 1 (continued from previous page) 
 
 
Total Population 0.120*** 0.124*** 0.129*** -2.027*** -2.006*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.067) (0.068) 
      
GDP Per Capita 0.536*** 0.546*** 0.548*** -0.241* -0.256** 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.124) (0.125) 
      
Interaction: Diaspora x New Migrants 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.406*** 0.403*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.030) (0.030) 
      
Constant -7.409*** -8.823*** -5.260*** -5.901*** 3.290*** 
 (0.461) (0.285) (0.500) (1.053) (1.162) 
      
 
Observations 22,932 22,932 22,932 22,932 22,932 
Log Likelihood -26,924.120 -26,981.600 -26,840.650 -14,525.010 -14,293.810 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 53,872.250 53,983.190 53,713.290 29,074.030 28,619.610 
 
Note: *p**p***p<0.01  
 
C. REGRESSION MODELS OVERVIEW 
Results from the given regression models are reported in Table 1. Models 1, 2 and 
3 measured the volume of Chinese state media tweets as the dependent variable. Model 4 
and 5, on the other hand, measure the volume of anti-China hashtags as the dependent 
variable. Since all our dependent variables are counts of positive integers, Poisson models 
were used for the regression analysis. The primary independent variables that are standard 
across all five models are the sizes of Chinese diaspora populations as well as the sub-
category of Chinese diaspora characterized as new migrants from the PRC. Both are 
measured as a proportion of the host country’s total population. 
Each model, in turn, includes (or excludes) additional independent variables for the 
purpose of testing the strength of the relationship between our primary independent 
variables and the dependent variable. Model 1, for instance, included total Chinese state 
media output volume as an additional independent variable while Model 2 omitted the 
same. On the other hand, Model 3 included not only total Chinese state media output but 
also considered the output by core issue. These same selection criteria likewise apply to 
the model set for measuring anti-China hashtags. For example, Model 4 included state 
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media output and Model 5 expanded the output to include core issues. By comparing the 
final Akaike Inference Criteria (AIC) score generated by each model with different sets of 
inputs, we can determine the combination of independent variables that have the strongest 
predictive relationship to our dependent variables. 
Nevertheless, populations seldom exist in a vacuum, especially in today’s social 
media-saturated environment; numerous socio-economic interactions are taking place that 
could also impact the saliency of Chinese state media. All five models therefore included 
additional control variables to better capture the effects of these influencers. For instance, 
we have factored in the volume of social media messages by language (Chinese vs. 
English), which accounts for the ethno-linguistic influences from the general population. 
Further, we have included the total volume of non-Chinese state media output, which could 
be indicative of broader trends in reporting on events of international significance. This 
could ensure that our interpretations of the regression results do not over-emphasize 
common narratives that are shared between Chinese and international media sources. On 
the macroeconomic side, we have also included national GDP per capita to explore the 
possibility that financial status could impact social media activities. All these control 
variables were measured in the same unit of analysis, by country and by day. 
Central to our hypotheses is the logic that recent Chinese migrants, as a function of 
their presence, affect the intra-demographic dynamics of the greater ethnic Chinese 
communities in their host countries in ways that were unprecedented with their 
predecessors. We introduced this notion as an “interaction variable” in our regression 
models by multiplying the new migrant variable with the diaspora variable. Any 
demonstrated significance in this “interaction variable” would indicate intricacies between 
the diaspora and the new migrants, in which each category influences the effects of the 
other. 
Finally, we need to establish whether or not our dependent variables were indeed 
caused by our independent variables. While this study will not likely establish absolute 
causality, we can, however, uncover some evidence of causality by observing whether 
statistical significance exists between variables that are staggered in a chronological order. 
If we want to conclude that the increase in tweets about a certain Chinese state media 
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narrative is triggered by a corresponding spike in state media output on the same topic, we 
must be able to observe the latter occurring first temporally before the former. Extending 
this logic to our regression, we have time-lapsed the occurrences of our social and news 
media-based independent variables by 24 hours vis-à-vis the occurrences of our dependent 
variables. This could help us detect the presence of any time-sensitive action/reaction 
cycle. 
As a curiosity, we have also included the two dependent variables as an independent 
variable in each other’s regression models. Together with the time-lapsed method of 
analysis, we can determine whether the volume of social media messages about Chinese 
state media content could be a viable independent variable in itself and trigger occurrences 
of anti-China hashtags abroad, and vice versa. 
D. DIASPORIC INFLUENCE ON STATE MEDIA SALIENCY  
Is the saliency of Chinese state media higher in countries with a larger diaspora 
population?  
Let us start with the results from the regression models that measure social media 
messages reposting Chinese state media content as their dependent variable (Models 1–3 
in Table 1). As we can see, the coefficients for the migrant variable, diaspora variable, and 
their interactions are all statistically significant (p < 0.05). As such, the trade-offs in the 
directions of each variable’s effects is difficult to intuit directly from the table. We need to 
visualize these effects with a prediction graph that calculates the expected value of the 
dependent variable at differing levels of each independent variable. Figure 13 shows the 
prediction derived from Model 1. The solid lines show the predicted value of the dependent 
variable at a given level of the independent variable with other variables held constant at 
their means, and shaded bands show 95% confidence intervals. The X-axis depicts the sizes 
of the ethnic Chinese diasporas in proportion to the total population of their host countries. 
The Z-axis (color bar), on the other hand, further parsed out a country’s new mainland 
Chinese migrants population from the larger ethnic Chinese diaspora. The “green” end of 
the spectrum denotes countries that have the highest proportion of recent migrants from 
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mainland China; the “red” end, conversely, depicts those countries that have the smallest 
percentage. 
 
Figure 13. Chinese State Media Saliency Based on Diaspora Size 
Several key observations can be made. First, surprisingly, the larger the proportion 
of ethnic Chinese population to the total population in a host country, the less popular the 
Chinese state media contents appear to be. This is evident in the three negative slopes (red, 
blue, and green lines) depicting the declining volume of tweets about Chinese state media 
content along the X-axis. This observed inverse relationship belies a key assumption 
behind our hypotheses—that countries with a larger diaspora population will witness 
higher levels in the saliency of Chinese state media narratives on their national social media 
space. In fact, this evidence suggests the opposite is true.  
Second, the rate at which Chinese state media loses its saliency across countries of 
increasing diaspora populations differs significantly based on the relative size of the 
mainland Chinese migrant populations. For example, countries with a larger percentage of 
new Chinese migrants (green line) appear to experience a much gentler rate of loss in 
Chinese state media saliency than countries with smaller percentage of the same (red line). 
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This moderating effect that the new migrants have on Chinese state media’s mainstream 
saliency is still conceptually aligned with our conjecture that this particular class of 
diaspora are more inclined to promote Chinese state narratives abroad. 
Interestingly, an inflection point is visible at the furthest left of the graph, where 
countries with the smallest percentage of ethnic Chinese population to its total population 
will briefly witness a reversal of the aforementioned effect—in that, the presence of new 
Chinese migrants is actually associated with a decreased state media saliency. Looking at 
the graph as a whole, the differences amongst the three diaspora-to-saliency rates are less 
dramatic in countries with smaller proportion of ethnic Chinese diaspora to their total 
population than in countries with higher proportion of ethnic Chinese diaspora. This is 
visibly evident as the gaps between the three lines progressively widen along the X-axis.  
One interpretation, therefore, could be that in countries with a historically high 
percentage of ethnic Chinese demographics (think Singapore, Thailand, or Malaysia), an 
influx of new migrants from mainland China will be much more effective in retaining the 
relevance of Beijing’s narratives on mainstream social media. Conversely, in countries at 
the opposite end of the Chinese Diaspora-to-Total Population ratio (think Mexico or Cuba), 
new Chinese migrants will only have limited influence on the mainstream population’s 
willingness to circulate Chinese state media narratives. 
1. Geographical Depiction of Chinese State Media Saliency around the 
World 
Where was Chinese state media the most salient? Admittedly, looking at the 
aggregated global statistics alone could not produce the regionally focused descriptions 
that are of more interest to geopolitical watchers and policymakers alike. The regression 
models are also unable to pinpoint in which countries Chinese state media was more salient 
than others. Figure 14 compares the circulation of the state media output in the social media 
space of each host country by presenting a geographical “heat” map. This map depicts the 
concentration of tweets about Chinese state media content around the world, based on the 




Figure 14. Chinese State Media Retweets (10% Sample) – Aug. 1, 2013, to 
Jul. 31, 2014 
One oddity is immediately apparent—tweets from within mainland China. After 
all, the Communist state has infamously banned all western social media from its internet. 
While certain domestic usage of VPNs could theoretically bypass China’s Great Fire Wall 
and explain this phenomenon, the magnitude of the tweets pointed to another more 
plausible answer. In this case, the fact that the geo-references of the Tweets were based on 
each Twitter user’s self-identified profile suggested that it is much more likely that the 
tweets were actually originating outside of China by users who have selected China as their 
“hometown.” One can even take a step further and assume those shown tweeting inside 
China were in fact recent expats who still saw themselves as Chinese first—evident in their 
choice of hometown affiliation. They are, therefore, a perfect fit to the “new migrant” 
profile. 
While Figure 14 shows an expectedly higher saliency of Chinese state media in 
diaspora-heavy countries such as U.S., UK, and Japan, it also revealed outliers such as 
Mexico and Pakistan, where ethnic Chinese presence were relatively negligible as a ratio 
to the total population. For these outliers, two possible scenarios could be occurring. First, 
a few “repeat offenders,” likely the new migrants themselves, were doing most of the 
retweets; or second, Chinese state media were indeed viewed in these countries as a news 




Figure 15. Chinese State Media Retweets as a Proportion of Total Tweets 
(10% Sample) 
One way to further contextualize the concentration of tweets of Chinese state media 
content is to contrast it against the total tweet volume in any given country. The result 
would provide a more accurate assessment of Chinese state media’s true influence as a 
proportion of a national Twitter community. Figure 15 shows a revised geographical heat 
map depicting the distribution of tweets as a proportion of the total Twitter traffic in their 
respective countries. There are two “hotspots” where the proportions were the highest: 
China and certain countries in Central Africa. For the former, our suspicion was confirmed 
that a preponderance of the Twitter postings “coming out of China” were indeed state 
media driven.  
On the other hand, Central Africa, specifically Niger, was a more revealing case. 
The interpretation here is that in Niger, where a nascent Twitter community has been 
bourgeoning, a relatively large volume of mainstream tweets was actually a circulation of 
Chinese state media content. Another way of looking at this is that Beijing’s narratives 
appeared to be more salient in Niger than other parts of the world. Keep in mind, however, 
a high level of circulation does not necessarily translate to the public perception of the 
media outlets as being reliable or even truthful. 
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2. State Media Output and Core Issue-Specific Content as Independent 
Variables 
Does the volume of Chinese state media output, in addition to diasporic presence, 
play a role in promoting the circulation of Beijing’s narratives abroad? This question was 
framed in Model 1 and Model 3 (Table 1) where Chinese state media outputs are included 
as an additional independent variable both in the form of an aggregated news source and 
when parsed down to the core issue, respectively. Model 2, on the other hand, is a reduced 
specification that excludes all news media volume variables. A comparison of AIC scores 
amongst these three models can help to determine whether Chinese state media output is 
indeed a viable independent variable when combined with Chinese diasporic presence. The 
model with the lower AIC score would theoretically be more accurate in predicting the 
dependent variable. 
As one can see, Model 2 exhibits the highest AIC score (53,983.190) and therefore 
can be assumed to be the least accurate of the three. Model 3 yields the lowest AIC score 
(53,713.290) and should therefore be viewed as the most plausible model. One 
interpretation could be the following: the size of diasporic presence, combined with the 
level of state media contents containing specific core issues (Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and 
SCS), are the best predictors of the saliency of Beijing’s narratives in national social media 
environments around the world.  
There is a more revealing discovery upon examining the coefficients for the 
independent variables’ influences. The direction of the influence from the Chinese state 
media output (in total) actually shift from being positive (0.343) to negative (-0.990) as we 
transition from Model 1 to Model 3. Meanwhile, the coefficients on core issue-specific 
state media outputs all yield positive relationships. The first conclusion to be drawn is that 
most of the public interest generated by Chinese state media content on Twitter, in fact, 
can be attributed to these four core issues. Furthermore, as suggested by the results of 
Model 3, when one separates the core issue-specific contents from the aggregated Chinese 
state media output, the influence from the latter actually becomes negative. A more 
revealing interpretation here is that when Chinese state media outlets omit the four core 
issues, they could actually risk diminishing their overall saliency online.  
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3. Anti-China Sentiment as an Independent Variable 
What other factors could impact the saliency of Chinese state media in a national 
community? Models 1, 2 and 3 all indicate that anti-China tweets act as an independent 
variable with statistically significance coefficients (p < 0.05). The coefficients ranged from 
0.202 to 0.211 across the models, suggesting that regardless of the presence or volume of 
Chinese state media output, anti-China tweets will always tend to trigger more online 
interest in Beijing’s narratives. Since all of the social media-based variables are already 
time-lapsed by 24 hours, this evidence is also consistent with a causal interpretation. One 
interpretation could be that the spread of anti-China sentiment on Twitter may have 
triggered the pro-China camp to rush to Beijing’s defense by doubling down on the state 
media’s narratives. In a less polarizing scenario, the spread of anti-China sentiment on 
Twitter could have piqued the curiosity of other micro-bloggers less familiar with the 
Chinese narratives to see for themselves what Beijing has to say. In both scenarios, China’s 
narratives are increasingly being circulated, alongside the saliency of the Chinese state 
media. 
E. DIASPORIC INFLUENCE ON ANTI-CHINA SENTIMENT 
Is the volume of anti-China postings lower in countries with a larger Chinese 
diaspora population? Conventional wisdom has taught us that overseas Chinese are often 
considered the “model immigrants” in their respective host countries. It is not difficult to 
imagine that the presence of a productive Chinese immigrant community, through its 
symbiotic interactions with the greater society, could eventually pave the way for a more 
favorable view of China around the world. A country with such sentiment would certainly 
encounter less anti-China postings on its national social media traffic. 
We will now turn to the results from the regression models that measure the number 
of anti-China hashtags as their dependent variable (Model 4–5 in Table 1). Once again, the 
coefficients for the migrant variable, diaspora variable, and their interactions are all 
statistically significant (p < 0.05). This means that the trade-offs in the directions of each 
variable’s effects are not readily discernable from the table; a prediction graph is best suited 
to describe the effects. Figure 16 shows the predictions derived from Model 4. The 
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definitions for X and Z-axis are the same as in Figure 13. The Y-axis, in this case, measures 
the volume of anti-China hashtags posted in a national Twitter community.  
 
Figure 16. Volume of Anti-China Hashtags Based on Size of Diaspora 
The downward slopes visible in all three lines appear to support our “Diaspora as 
Goodwill Ambassador” hypothesis. In general, countries with a larger population of ethnic 
Chinese diaspora as a proportion of its total population will witness less anti-China posts 
in its local social media environment. While a broad trend can be established at the macro-
level, we need to highlight importance nuances at the intra-demographic level. 
Similar to the previous model on state media saliency, we see the diaspora and the 
new migrant population each exerting distinctly different levels of effect on their host 
countries’ social media activities. For one, the rate at which anti-China postings decreases 
across countries of increasing diaspora size appears to be determined in part by these 
countries’ ratios of new mainland Chinese migrants to the total population. In that, 
countries with a larger percentage of new migrants from mainland China will generally 
witness a more constant level of anti-China postings, as depicted by the relatively gentler 
slope of the green line. 
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A pronounced inflection point is visible near X = 10–3.5, which denotes countries 
with an ethnic Chinese population constituting 0.03 percent of the total population. To the 
left of this inflection point, the larger the ratio of new Chinese migrants to the total 
population in a given country (green line), the less its national Twitter community will post 
anti-China hashtags. Conversely, the smaller the ratio of the new Chinese migrants to the 
total population in a given country (red line), the more one can expect to see anti-China 
postings in its national Twitter community. 
Moving to the right of the inflection point, however, we see a reversal to this 
pattern, albeit at a much smaller contrast between the rates of change. In this case, the 
larger the ratio of new Chinese migrant size to the total population in a given country (green 
line), the more likely its national Twitter community will generate anti-China postings, 
when compared to a country with the smaller proportion of the same (red line.) Since 
majority of the countries around the world carries an ethnic Chinese population that is at 
least 0.03 percent of its total population, this predicted pattern bears more weight for 
geopolitical analysis. 
At this point, an important observation can be made on the new migrants as an 
independent variable in our regression analysis. Both the prediction graph and the 
regression statistics reveal that the new migrants might not be exerting the expected level 
of “goodwill” effect on the mainstream populations of their host countries as postulated in 
our hypothesis. Rather, the positive and statistically significant coefficient (1.34, p < 0.01) 
associated with the new mainland Chinese migrants suggest that their presence could 
correlate to an increased anti-China sentiment. In all instances, an ethnic Chinese diaspora 
population with a minimum share of recent migrants from Mainland China appears to be 
the better fit to our “Goodwill Ambassador” profile. 
1. Geographical Spread of Anti-China Hashtags 
Where are the anti-China hashtags the most prevalent? Figure 17 depicts the 
distribution of anti-China tweets around the world. We immediately notice that this time 
there were no anti-China hashtags detected inside China, or more precisely, none from any 
of the Twitter users who have self-selected China as their hometown. One potential 
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interpretation is that amongst the Twitter users who best fit the profile of the “recent 
migrants from the Mainland,” anti-China sentiments were generally low. 
 
Figure 17. Anti-China Hashtags Distribution (10% Sample)—Aug. 1, 2013, 
to Jul. 31, 2014 
The “heat map” reveals that anti-China Tweets seems to be the most prevalent in 
the UK, U.S., Australia, Japan, and India. What could explain this? The hostilities against 
China on both Japanese and Indian social media are long expected due to these countries’ 
historical animosity. China’s bilateral relations with the United States and Australia also 
soured over the former’s increasingly aggressive stance on the South China Sea during the 
test period. Therefore, it is entirely plausible that geopolitical sentiments spilled into 
domestic discussions and are consequently reflected in the micro-blogging communities. 
But could the presence of an ethnic Chinese diaspora also be a factor to consider? 
Looking at the U.S. and Australia again, these are countries with not only some of the 
largest population of Chinese diaspora but also new Chinese migrants, particularly 
students. At the same time, note the negligible amount of anti-China tweets emanating from 
Southeast Asia—where, coincidentally, new migrant populations have been historically 
low despite the region being the world’s largest hub for ethnic Chinese communities. In 
the UK, where we have seen the most anti-China tweets, the opposite was true—a large 
Chinese student population nested within a comparably smaller Chinese diaspora. In fact, 
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the overwhelming majority of ethnic Chinese in the UK are the students or those who have 
secured local employment afterward. 
Thus, the geographical spread of the anti-China hashtags appears to further 
reinforce our suspicion gleaned from the previous results—that the presence of recent 
migrants from Mainland China is indeed associated with more anti-China sentiments 
online. 
2. State Media’s Impact on Anti-China Sentiment  
Can the promulgation of Chinese state media narratives improve the favorability 
of China abroad? As mentioned in the previous chapter, the PRC’s influence strategy 
abroad is, in part, buttressed on the effective propagation of its desired narratives to the 
international audience, and concurrently to drown out the critical voices. This tactic has 
been described as “making the party’s voice loudest of them all.” Models 4 and 5 in Table 
1 set out to test this notion by considering Chinese state media output volume as an 
additional independent variable in our regression analysis on the posting of anti-China 
hashtags on Twitter. Both models associate the presence of Chinese state media content 
with a negative and statistically significant coefficient, at -1.890 and -9.957, respectively 
(p < .01). This seems to suggest that higher saturation of Chinese state media content online 
can indeed lead to less anti-China sentiments. But there are important caveats to be made. 
Model 5 further parsed out the four core issue-specific media contents (Taiwan, 
Xinjiang, Tibet, and SCS) from the total Chinese state media output and calculated them 
as their own independent variables. The resulting coefficients from all four core issue-
specific media outputs yield positive values, with Xinjiang-related media contents exerting 
the largest effect (3.31). A comparison between the AIC scores indicate that Model 5 in 
fact is the more plausible specification of the two. The reversal in the direction of influences 
associated with core issue-specific media contents illuminates an important observation—
if Beijing focuses its media on promoting its desired narratives on the four contested topics, 
it could actually damage, rather than improve, its favorability abroad. The state media 
outlets have a much better chance of enhancing China’s image when they choose to cover 
more benign topics unrelated to the core issues. 
 
67 
3. Tweeting of State Media vs. Expression of Anti-China Sentiment 
We have observed previously that anti-China social media messages can lead to 
more tweets about Chinese state media narratives. Can the opposite be true? Both Model 4 
and 5 in Table 1 demonstrate that the same topics that are associated with more postings 
of Chinese state media content are also associated with a higher volume of anti-China posts. 
Given the lagged independent variables, this evidence indicates that Chinese media’s 
perceived saliency appears to trigger a certain level of backlash online. In the previous 
model, we postulated that pro-PRC migrants could be rushing to retweet Beijing’s 
narratives as a defensive gesture against the emerging anti-China vitriols online. This 
current model suggests a potential sequel, where micro-blogging communities critical of 
the PRC have reacted angrily after encountering the state media retweets and decided to 
respond with even more anti-China hashtags. In fact, the distinction between sequel and 
prequel could be blurred as the scenario drags on. The pattern of back and forth—the 
tweeting and retweeting—might eventually become cyclical. 
F. SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
How well did the quantitative results support the initial hypotheses and postulated 
trilateral model for diaspora influence on social media? Figure 18 is the “revised version” 
of the relational model we first postulated in Chapter 1. Results from our regression 
analysis have contradicted some of the key tenets behind the initial hypotheses. 
• We discovered that a larger Chinese diaspora population does not necessarily 
lead to higher salience of Beijing’s narrative, and the pattern could in fact be 
the opposite.  
• Cumulating evidence suggests that the “Diaspora as Goodwill Ambassador” 
notion require further qualification. Both the prediction graph and regression 
statistics indicate that the presence of recent mainland Chinese migrants 
might be associated with mainstream backlash against China’s narratives and 
consequently could devalue China’s credibility around the world. 
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• State media content related to the four core issue topics—Xinjiang, Taiwan, 
Tibet, and SCS—appear to be generating most of the public interest in 
Chinese state media contents, while at the same time stirring anti-China 
sentiments. One conclusion could be that not all publicity is good publicity 
after all for Beijing. 
 




VI. CASE STUDIES  
The purpose of the case studies is to explain the quantitative findings from  
Chapter IV in the proper regional context. Whenever possible, this section will also 
reference the PRC’s influence strategy and playbook that were outlined in Chapter III to 
describe the processes under which the quantitative results have transpired on the ground. 
In this way, the case studies serve as a sort of “reality check” for both the aggregated data 
science as well as the theoretical framework behind the conventional understanding of the 
PRC’s diasporic influence campaign. 
A. A QUALITATIVE ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN THE QUANTITATIVE 
The fundamental question that the next two case study chapters seek to answer is: 
why are the “New” Chinese migrants better suited to promote the circulation of Chinese 
state-run content on their respective host countries’ mainstream social media than older 
Chinese diaspora? There is a technological and perceptional component to this question. 
The most immediate consideration is that Beijing has undeniably improved its ability to 
embed state media content within the social media landscape. This is the technical pre-
requisite that would allow the youthful social media users—both diaspora and non-ethnic 
Chinese—to access Beijing’s state-run media content in the first place.  
A more granular approach is necessary, however, to ascertain whether the 
mainstream users had direct exposure to Beijing’s narrative and unilaterally decided to 
repost the content, or was their awareness of this narrative somehow enhanced by the 
surrounding diaspora communities? This chapter asserts that the two scenarios are not 
mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, the regression results suggest the latter scenario—
particularly when the involved Twitter communities have experienced an inflow of recent 
migrants from Mainland China—could provide the most proximate explanation behind the 
high level of Chinese state media circulation amongst mainstream Twitter users. 
A sub-question of equal relevance to policymakers is whether the diasporic 
influence will actually translate to an overall increase in the favorability of Beijing’s 
narrative in the mainstream society? The quantitative analysis of Twitter data during the 
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test window has revealed an increase in the co-occurrence of anti-PRC hashtags with the 
influx of the “new” Chinese migrants from the PRC. This discovery puts the “Chinese 
Diaspora as Goodwill Ambassador” hypothesis into serious doubt. 
Additionally, result from the time-lapse analysis has indicated that anti-PRC 
hashtags might also have stemmed from an increase in public tweets about Chinese state 
media contents. This suggested that the culprit might not be Beijing’s message alone but 
the online users doing the echoing. What could be the demographical profile of this group? 
Our regression analysis, unfortunately, was not designed to uncover the individual 
identities behind the tweets. Yet, the aggregated results from our model uncovered a 
curious pattern—the saliency of Chinese state media is at its height in populations with a 
large recent Chinese migrant community, preferably even outnumbering the second or 
third-generation ethnic Chinese. This observation is an important clue and suggests two 
possible scenarios to explain this regression pattern. The scenarios are not mutually 
exclusive. First, the interaction between the new migrants and their host countries’ general 
populations could generate wider public interest on Chinese state media content. Second, 
the individuals re-circulating Chinese state media narratives could in fact be the recent 
migrants themselves. 
The last scenario is particularly poignant considering that several recent public 
perception surveys have suggested that diasporic social media influence in its most zealous 
form could actually antagonize the mainstream population on certain divisive issues. One 
conclusion to be drawn is that while diaspora could elevate the saliency of the PRC’s 
narrative abroad, the feedback from the target audience might not always be in favor of 
Beijing. 
B. AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
FROM BEIJING’S DIASPORIC INFLUENCE STRATEGY 
We will use the cases of Australia and New Zealand as an illustration—where a 
large and seemingly malleable ethnic Han population has indeed elevated Beijing’s 




Where did Australia and New Zealand stand in our regression results? Figure 20 
depicts Australia and New Zealand’s positions on the prediction graph of state media 
saliency from the previous chapter. Both countries are on the medium to high side of ethnic 
Chinese demographics (4–6% of total population) and both experienced some of the 
highest influx of Mainland Chinese migrants in recent years—with Australia and New 
Zealand currently the top two destinations in Oceania for emigrating Chinese. With this 
large proportion of its total ethnic Chinese population being new migrants from Mainland 
China (estimated at 40–50%), we have consequently observed a sustained level of saliency 
of Chinese state media on the mainstream social media of these host countries. A similar 
observation can be made on Australia and New Zealand’s predicted level of anti-China 
sentiment on Twitter. Both countries stand on the high end in our global data in terms of 
anti-China posting volumes, as a result of their large new migrant to ethnic Chinese 
diaspora ratios. 
 









Figure 21. Reinterpreted Diasporic Influence Model (in the Context of Australia 
and New Zealand) 
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Figure 21 is a reinterpretation of the trilateral influence model based on the 
regression results as applied to Australia and New Zealand. Subsequent sections of this 
chapter will attempt to illuminate the model vis-à-vis each of the three key actors. We will 
explore the model from the perspective of the PRC, the diaspora, and the host country 
population. In the first section, discussions will focus on how Beijing is able to unify a 
heterogeneous diaspora population in Australia and New Zealand by “harmonizing” the 
various diasporic mass media outlets into one single voice—Beijing’s voice. The second 
section will explore how this seemingly “unified” diaspora made its voices heard first on 
the diasporic social media platforms and then spilling into the mainstream cyberspace. The 
last section will explain the reactions from the host country mainstream populations, both 
positive and negative ones, in regards to the diaspora’s increasingly aggressive activities 
on social media. 
1. CHINA’S PERSPECTIVE 
a. Global Strategy: Going Out and Telling China’s Story Well 
Under Xi Jinping’s tutelage, Chinese state media has undergone a dramatic 
transformation—both in its content and delivery—on a scale that is not unlike the “Going 
Out” of China’s economics sector some thirty years prior. Beijing’s state-run media, led 
by Xinhua, People’s Daily, and China Radio International, has dramatically broadened its 
scope of coverage from a narrow domestic focus to strategic messaging on a global scale. 
These media have shifted their modus operandi from one that is preoccupied with passive 
damage control to a much more assertive approach in a bid to control the narrative abroad. 
This new operating philosophy is perhaps best characterized in Xi’s own guidance to his 
propaganda chiefs in 2014 “to go out and tell China’s story well”.63 China’s official media 
outlets have since expanded its footprint around the world at a frantic pace. In Australia 
and New Zealand, Chinese state media’s presence can be felt through the increasing 
number of offshore correspondents as well as partnerships with major English-language 
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media names to carry its content.64 But for the diasporic Chinese-language media, Beijing 
has a more nuanced approach. 
b. Beijing’s Diasporic Media Strategy: Promoting a Singular 
“Chinese-ness”  
The chapter on China’s influence playbook has described Beijing’s media strategy 
towards the overseas Chinese as one keen on harmonizing the diasporic mass media with 
the PRC’s own state media, a strategy known officially as haiwai huawen meiti ronghe (海
外华文媒体融合.) The goal of the “harmonizing” strategy, according to Anne-Marie Brady, is 
twofold—first, to stifle out potential dissidents from within the diaspora communities; and 
second, upon completion of the first, to turn this seemingly unanimous—and arguably, 
more legitimate—diasporic voice outward to influence the mainstream public opinion.65 
While scholars have generally agreed on Beijing’s desired outcomes, the process through 
which the PRC implements this “harmonizing” strategy around the world remains 
speculative. Australia and New Zealand, however, are unique cases that could shed light 
onto this process. 
Recent international spotlight on alleged Chinese meddling into Australia and New 
Zealand’s inner political circle has led to a closer scrutiny over Beijing’s control over the 
diaspora, including its vast influence on local Chinese-language media outlets. Several high 
profile academic journals and investigative reports have since painted an alarming 
picture—Beijing has been quietly monopolizing Australia and New Zealand’s diasporic 
media across all platforms to include emerging social media technology. To the surprise of 
many, this process began almost thirty years ago when the first wave of the immigrants 
from Mainland China entered Australia and New Zealand under Deng Xiaoping’s “Open 
                                                 
64 Wanning Sun, Chinese-Language Media in Australia: Development, Challenges and Opportunities (Ultimo, 




65 Ann-Marie Brady, “Magic Weapon: China’s Political Influence Activities under Xi Jinping” (paper presented 
at the conference on “The corrosion of democracy under China’s global influence,” supported by the Taiwan 




Door” reform. Henceforth, Australia and New Zealand’s traditionally Cantonese-speaking 
diaspora gradually became outnumbered by the newer Mandarin-speaking immigrants 
from Mainland China. Parsing through the details in these reports, a rudimentary Chinese 
media playbook for Oceania begins to emerge. The pattern is a familiar one—Beijing 
sought to blur the distinction between overseas diaspora (huaqiao, 华侨) and those of 
Chinese descent in general (huaren, 华人). This is the same ubiquitous guidance from the 
CCP observed in its greater diasporic influence strategy. In the case of media, the 
byproduct of the integration would be a new voice loudly in favor of China. 
c. “Harmonizing” Techniques in Practice 
Upon closer examination, the PRC appears to have been employing one of three 
“harmonizing” techniques against local diasporic media, and in escalating order. These 
techniques are to co-opt, buy out, and if all else fail, starve out.  
First, state media outlets, such as Xinhua or China Radio International (CRI), would 
attempt to co-opt local media by offering content sharing with seemingly no-strings 
attached. This option is particularly attractive to smaller cash-strapped migrant media 
outlets struggling to stay competitive. These “journalistic joint ventures” are particularly 
prevalent in Australia, where traditionally independent Chinese media outlets have signed 
multiple content cooperation agreement with the PRC, transforming themselves into the 
mouthpieces for Chinese state media almost overnight.66 
If this voluntary approach fails, the PRC will then attempt to buy-out the diasporic 
medias outlets via its proxies or satellite firms—by either purchasing shares of the parent 
conglomerate, or if unable, exerting pressure against the same, since most of these 
conglomerates have considerable commercial interests inside China. Once Beijing attains 
a position of influence, it could either directly muzzle the subsidiary media outlets, or 
preferably, these outlets would choose to self-censor. 67  An example of this buy-out 
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technique is evident in Global CAMG, a media conglomerate in Melbourne that owns some 
of the most popular Chinese-language media outlets in Australia. The company is 
ostensibly set up by a local businessman, Tommy Jiang; few knew that a Beijing-based 
company called Guoguang Century Media Consultancy owns over 60% of its share. Even 
fewer know that this Beijing-based company, in turn, is actually owned by Chinese State 
Media—CRI. It should not come as a surprise that radio stations flagged under Global 
CAMG now carry the same contents as China’s state radio.68 
Lastly, if both techniques fail, Beijing could deprive local media outlets of revenue. 
This could take form of Beijing’s proxies pressuring major advertisers to withdraw support 
for uncooperative media outlets. Since most regional media depends on advertising profits 
to survive, this technique is particularly devastating. Beijing, via its proxies, could even 
mount expensive legal proceeding against its victims. In a recent interview with NPR, Chen 
Weijian, an exiled PRC dissident who has since established an independent newspaper in 
New Zealand, recounted how the Communist Party continued its prosecution abroad. 
According to Chen, a pro-Beijing newspaper in Auckland “sued him for defamation after 
he criticized it for being too pro-Beijing,” and the resulting legal procedure bankrupted his 
paper. The plaintiff was reportedly funded generously by the PRC.69 
d. Assessing the Impact on the Chinese Migrant Media Sphere 
Most scholars and commentators would agree that the aforementioned techniques 
have been effective so far in achieving their intended goals. The CCP has more or less 
succeeded in “harmonizing” the once diverse diaspora media landscape in Auckland and 
Sydney. A recent report from University of Technology Sydney concluded there is a 
“discernible shift in Chinese language migrant media from a mostly critical to a mostly 
supportive stance in their coverage of China, Chinese government and issues and topics 
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that are considered to be politically sensitive in China.70“ The same report compared and 
contrasted Singtao Daily’s (星岛日报) coverage of the Tiananmen Square protest in 1989 
with the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement in 2014—during the former, the newspaper was 
overwhelmingly supportive of the student protestors; whereas during the latter, the editorial 
was unabashedly critical.71 In a trend that is quickly becoming the norm, most Australian 
Chinese-language media have tried to avoid Beijing’s ire by self-censorship on “hot topic” 
issues such as Falun Gong, Xinjiang, and Tibet. For instance, in June of 2014, majority of 
the Chinese language media in Australia omitted any mention of the 25th Anniversary of 
the Tiananmen Square Massacre. 
Conversely, should Beijing decide to publicize its stance on these sensitive issues, 
the state media will almost certainly have the monopoly over the narrative. Even for those 
few courageous independent outlets who dare to challenge, their voice would likely be 
drowned out by the peers already succumbed to Beijing’s influence. In the eyes of the 
mainstream audience outside of the migrant community, this contrived appearance of 
unison could be mistakenly perceived as consensus with Beijing’s voice. The lack of 
competing diasporic media views should be taken into consideration when attempting to 
explain the significant reposting and retweeting of Chinese state media content in the 
study’s data. There often may be no alternative narrative for mainstream consumption other 
than the state-run media, at least when it comes to issues that China cares about. 
2. The Diaspora’s Perspective 
Thus far we have assessed Beijing’s diasporic media approach strictly from a 
strategic messaging angle; but an increasingly homogenous media sphere also impacts the 
                                                 
70 Wanning Sun, Chinese-Language Media in Australia: Development, Challenges and Opportunities (Ultimo, 




71 Wanning Sun, Chinese-Language Media in Australia: Development, Challenges and Opportunities (Ultimo, 






social dynamics of the diaspora communities as a whole. For the Chinese migrants, 
particularly those First Generation diaspora who have yet to be fully assimilated, diasporic 
media provides the first, and sometimes the only, social-cultural interactions with the new 
world. In the context of a propaganda-saturated media sphere, Beijing’s narrative could 
have a compounded influence on these immigrants. On the one hand, we have witnessed a 
stronger solidarity amongst the diaspora communities in Australia and New Zealand, 
congealing around Beijing’s narrative of their shared “Chinese-ness.” On the other, these 
diaspora communities are also more likely to self-compartmentalize, becoming more 
impervious to out-group influences. This last observation and its ramifications to the 
quantitative results is the focus of this section.  
a. The Rise of a “Virtual Chinatown” 
The phenomenon of the new diaspora’s self-compartmentalization was first 
described by Phoebe Li of Auckland University as akin to an “Imagined Chinatown,” along 
with all of its inherent historical and social connotations. For the diaspora, Chinatown has 
always been a place where they can “seek psychological comfort and sense of Chinese 
solidarity from others whom they may never meet physically.” 72  For the outsiders 
however, the meaning of Chinatown could vary significantly. In Australia and New 
Zealand, Chinatowns have evolved from an urban feature stigmatized by racial exclusion 
to a kind of cultural “theme park” for a Eurocentric population. These varied perceptions 
have largely been transplanted to the online sphere—manifesting into a kind of “Virtual 
Chinatown.” The rise of internet and microblogging technology has only precipitated the 
compartmentalization of the diaspora communities due to these platforms’ interactive 
format. In many cases, it appears that virtual interactions have supplanted the physical 
ones. 
A brief content analysis of a popular web-based media site catering specifically to 
the Chinese diaspora  (www.chinese.net.nz/) will illustrate this point. Figure 22 provides a 
snapshot of the website 新西兰中文网 on an average day. The site is described as being 
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privately-owned by the local diaspora since 2001. The design and layout of the page is 
typical of today’s Chinese-language media sites in both New Zealand and Australia. The 
website embodies the “Virtual Chinatown” concept on three levels: social, economic, and 
cultural. 
One of the most striking features of the homepage is the high concentration of soft 
news items—contents are prioritized based on their relevance to the migrants’ daily lives. 
Typical headlines include “car buying tips for new migrants” and “how to renew expired 
Chinese passport after becoming New Zealand citizen.” These diaspora-friendly topics, 
which are unlikely discussed by mainstream media, would draw their intended audience 
in, especially those lacking English literacy or familiarity with urban life in New Zealand. 
As a hat-tip to the social media-savvy millennials, the website even offers an app version 
that is compatible with Weibo (微博) and WeChat (微信). Conversely, the absence of any 
visible links to Western social media could further isolate the diaspora and hamper their 




Figure 22. Preliminary Content Scraping of 新西兰中文网 at 
www.chinese.net.nz. 
The Virtual Chinatown effect also spills into the commercial aspect of immigrant 
life. Taking a look at Figure 22, the website exhibits a high advertisement to content ratio—
no less than 30% of the hyperlinks are for Chinese-based online stores or familiar Chinese 
brands. This trend is not unexpected considering most private migrant media depends on 
advertisement revenue to survive. Phoebe Li believes this commercial practicality, both for 
the audience and the media companies, is the Virtual Chinatown’s defining characteristic. 
She explains that a “boundary of socioeconomic space” has been forged in the minds of 
the diaspora communities, further confining them psychologically to this invisible migrant 
community. In fact, one particular section of the website in this example has transformed 
into a kind of virtual One-Stop-Shop for not only Chinese-focused e-commerce, but also 
diaspora-oriented job ads, social clubs, and even dating for Chinese singles. The Virtual 
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Chinatown has become a hub for networking within a network. Newly arrived immigrants 
will never have to step out of the Virtual Chinatown—nor their apartments for that matter. 
Despite the website being labeled as privately owned, Beijing’s influence is 
tangible throughout. This is reflected not only in the aforementioned soft news  
topics—“renewing Chinese passports”—but also the ubiquitous state-sponsored tourism 
advertisement for the Mainland. Juxtaposed with images of the beautiful Fujian coast are 
the latest reviews of popular Chinese TV dramas. Indeed, the Virtual Chinatown in many 
ways is a microcosm of the real China. In this way, the audience is encouraged to remain 
culturally and emotionally attached to their kin country. The subliminal message bears 
uncanny resemblance to Beijing’s strategy to blur the distinction between diaspora (华侨) 
and ethnic Chinese (华人), and this is most likely by design. If the subliminal is not enough, 
Beijing’s tacit endorsement is also visible in the numerous links to state media such as 
People’s Daily and its many affiliates, where the diaspora can access the real “hard news” 
items in the Party’s flavor. Finally, the Chinese Embassy also lends its public service 
announcements at the very bottom of the page. These are solemn reminders to the overseas 
Chinese community that the “motherland” is always just one click away. 
To summarize, a Virtual Chinatown engenders a strong homogenous diaspora 
identity but at the cost of the diaspora’s ability and willingness to socialize outside of their 
ethnic network. To say the atrophied interaction is unconducive to ethnic integration would 
be an understatement. Some scholars have described the social dynamics between the 
Chinese diaspora and their host country as a “one-way” stream. In that, the former is 
relatively impervious to outside influence but will not shy away from protesting to the latter 
on issues threatening to the in-group identity. In the “harmonized” media landscape that 
we have described, issues of diaspora identity are quickly becoming interchangeable with 
issues of Chinese national identity. Indeed, Chinese nationalism in general has become the 
favorite subject of many lively online discussions—where populist sentiments, often 
carried forth by young migrant students, spill into the mainstream social media sphere of 
the host countries. 
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b. “Virtual Chinatown” and the Rise of Chinese Nationalism.  
Professor Wanning Sun’s 2016 report vividly captures the role of Chinese-language 
media overseas in spreading Chinese nationalism amongst the diaspora in Australia. After 
a comprehensive content scraping of major media in both their traditional and online 
platforms, Sun observed that on polarizing issues concerning China’s national security, the 
diasporic media tend to “articulate both the Chinese official position and populist 
sentiments.” The former can be explained by the “harmonizing” effect already discussed, 
the latter, however, is a social phenomenon that is as much a response to Beijing’s call for 
action as the particular demographic’s own initiation. Sun observed that the migrant media 
in Australia concurrently drives and echoes the popular sentiments. And the more youthful 
online media outlets—especially those run by migrant students—are comparably more 
outspoken when it comes to issues of national pride. The outcome, he somberly cautioned, 
could “position the Chinese migrant community at odds with mainstream Australian 
society.”73 
So which diasporic groups are more likely to respond to Beijing’s propaganda and 
demonstrate Chinese nationalism? The answer is, as expected, those who recently came 
from the Mainland, or the “new” migrants. Within this population, the Chinese students 
are more likely to exhibit popular nationalistic tendencies. Both groups have steadily 
increased since the relaxation of China’s immigration policy under Deng in the 1980s. In 
2018, there are about 1.2 million ethnic Chinese in Australia; over 54% are considered 
“new” immigrants. A quarter of which, numbering about 150,000, are Chinese students 
seeking secondary and tertiary education.74 Similar migration patterns are discernible in 
New Zealand, albeit in a smaller proportion due to the country’s size. 
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The changing diaspora composition certainly favors the permeation and acceptance 
of Beijing’s state media, making the harmonizing strategy almost a customer-driven 
calculation for the smaller media outlets. But it would be unscrupulous—even 
prejudiced—to wave off all “New” Chinese immigrants as mindless followers of Chinese 
propaganda. Indeed, Fran Martin takes a different stance in a recent Economist article; he 
believes only a fringe of these new migrants are true believers of Beijing’s propaganda; 
most just think it is occasionally “cool” to change their social media profile pictures to the 
PRC flag on October 1st.75 Yet, it is difficult to discount the seemingly genuine pride of 
over 10,000 Chinese students who showed up to protect the Olympic Torch in Victoria as 
an isolated outlier; this group also displayed the same enthusiasm to welcome Li Keqiang’s 
recent visit to Melbourne. In effect, Sun Wanning described this fervor more accurately as 
a “synergy” between the overseas Chinese students and Beijing that is “sometimes planned 
but at times arising organically.”76 
Both Sun and Martin can agree that the few Chinese migrants who took the effort 
to act out their nationalism are often the ones catching the mainstream headlines. In 
consequence, they exert a disproportionally significant influence on Australian public 
perception of China. Unfortunately, the regression model did not distinguish whether the 
tweets of state media contents originated from the “same group” of prolific social media 
users in the diaspora communities. We can, however, reasonably speculate that the 
influence from this group contributed to the overall pattern in the dataset. 
c. Stepping Out of the “Virtual Chinatown” and onto the World 
So how can the “new” Chinese immigrants, whether a fringe or a sizable proportion 
of the total diaspora, emerge from the “Virtual Chinatown” and flaunt their nationalism to 
the outside world? This can be done physically via open demonstration or “virtually” on 
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the social media—at a much smaller opportunity cost—by echoing supported state media 
narrative. There is a technological and tactical component to this approach.  
First, the initiating diaspora must repackage the state media narratives onto a 
platform that is accessible to the mainstream audience. For materials originating from 
Weibo or WeChat, there must be a manual transfer to Twitter or Facebook, along with 
appropriate linguistic translations. In most cases, however, Chinese state media has 
redundant official handles on Western social media in the target language. The diaspora 
simply has to “repost” or “retweet” with their own comments. This could explain in part 
the higher level of reposts/retweets of Chinese state media handles in the quantitative 
results from countries with a relatively larger new migrant population such as Australia. 
The tactical aspects are a social media user’s manipulation of the frequency, 
sequence, and tone of the transmitted information to achieve the desired psychological 
effect on the target audience. Figure 23 presents a spectrum of diasporic sentiments towards 
the mainstream society—ranging from conciliatory to argumentative—on contested issues 
that pertain to China’s core interest. Additionally, we have highlighted few social media 
tactics that correspond to their respective sentiment. Most of the diasporic social media 
activities fall somewhere in the middle. Cheerleading with ubiquitous pro-PRC hashtags 
and accompanying state media articles appear to be the most prevalent tactic on issues such 
as the South China Sea based on the quantitative results. In contrast, the infamous “Little 
Pinks” (小粉红), an anonymous group of mostly young Chinese female netizens living in 
China and abroad, have become synonymous with extreme Chinese jingoism online.77 
Their ruthless trolling against Australian Olympic swimmer Marc Horton and ethnic-
Taiwanese K-Pop star Zhou Ziyu, both of whom were accused of violating China’s core 
interests, are just the latest example of these keyboard warriors’ cyber infamy..78  
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Figure 23. Possible Influencing Techniques Adopted by Chinese Social Media 
Users Who Have Recently Emigrated from Mainland China 
In a few instances, the hateful online vitriols could translate into physical violence. 
The latest episode took place in August of 2019, as Pro-Beijing Chinese students, 
emboldened by waves of social media support, attacked Hong Kong students and their 
Australian supporters during multiple peaceful protests across Sydney and Melbourne.79 
The events were widely covered by mainstream Australian media, with public sympathy 
overwhelmingly for the victims. Here, we have witnessed the “Virtual Chinatown” effect 
at its most detrimental form—divisive for the society and antagonistic along ethnic lines. 
Such negative episodes could account for the time-lapse cycles observed between anti-PRC 
hashtags and retweets of Chinese state media articles in the previous regression results. 
Beijing likely did not foresee the counterproductive second and third order effects from its 
patriotic youth overseas. 
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3. Host Country’s Perspective 
If Beijing’s diasporic engagement strategy was to leverage a unified migrant voice 
to induce a more favorable mainstream perception of China, the feedback from Australia 
has so far been mixed at best. 
a. Public Perception of China 
Public perception towards other countries can be inferred through opinion surveys. 
The Lowy Institute has been conducting such surveys on an annual basis since 2005. 
During 2013–2014, which reflects the quantitative data collection window, the Australian 
public’s trust in China to act responsibly in the world has remain relatively constant at 
57%. As Figure 24 shows, during the same period, there has been a 7-point increase in the 
Australian public perception of China being a military threat. This increase is likely due to 
the unflattering Western publicity over China’s provocative gestures in the South China 
Sea during that year. Taken together, the decade-long surveys indicate no significant sway 




Figure 24. Lowy Institute Survey Question: Do You Think China Will be a 
Military Threat in the Next 20 Years?80 
 
Figure 25. Lowy Institute Survey Question: Do You Trust China Will Act 
Responsibly in the World?81 
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b. Saliency Does Not Always Translate to Favorability 
We now revisit the question posed in the beginning—whether increased saliency 
of Chinese media narratives translates to an overall increase in the favorability of Beijing’s 
narrative around the world? There is no conclusive evidence that suggests this is the case. 
The one-way stream characterization of the Virtual Chinatown, where new migrants have 
balked at assimilating into their host countries, could also be reversed and applied to the 
mainstream Australians; the general public might have equally tuned out diasporic voices 
as another mouthpiece for Chinese Communist propaganda. 
The quantitative analysis of global social media has established a positive 
correlation between Chinese state media’s saliency in mainstream society and the size of 
the diaspora population. However, the public perception surveys in Australia demonstrate 
that this increased saliency only brings public awareness to an issue and generates 
discussions, at times even heated debates. The detected anti-China hashtags along with 
Chinese state media retweets in our data analysis shows that there is a fair chance that the 
saliency could actually promote antagonistic sentiments from the very audience that 









C. SOUTHEAST ASIA: A STUDY ON THE DYNAMICS BETWEEN THE 
NEW AND OLD GENERATIONS OF CHINESE DIASPORA 
In the previous case of Australia and New Zealand, we focused on the social 
dynamics between the Chinese diasporas and their host countries’ populations. It was noted 
that the presence of new migrants might have triggered some level of backlash against 
China within these host countries’ mainstream social media. In this case study, we will turn 
our attention inward to examine the interactions amongst the diaspora communities within 
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the ethnic Chinese demographic itself. The question we ask then is whether the influx of 
these recent Chinese migrants could also instigate anti-PRC sentiments from the older 
generations of ethnic Chinese overseas? 
The two sub-diasporic groups of our interest are the new and old generations of 
Chinese migrants, who often exhibit contrasting social values and ideologies that is a direct 
reflection on the extent of their assimilation into the general population. Indeed, our 
previous regression models have already yielded important clues as to the heterogeneous 
nature of the Chinese diaspora. The “interactive variables,” which is a statistical attempt to 
capture the dynamics between the two sub-groups in our regression analysis, all 
demonstrate significance; this is our first clue to the existence of an underlying pattern of 
inter-group interactions. Next, the prediction graphs derived from our regression models 
further revealed the diverging influences each sub-group seemed to impose on the general 
population. The interactions might, in fact, be inversely related—at least when it comes to 
how each group’s presence affects their host country’s interest in Beijing’s narratives. The 
more Mainland Chinese migrants there are in the general population, the more likely this 
population will encounter and circulate Chinese state media contents. Meanwhile, the 
opposite can be said of the presence of the older generations of ethnic Chinese. To ascertain 
whether these differences would lead to inter-group biases or even animosity, we need to 
take a qualitative survey of a region where the Chinese diaspora’s generational divides are 
ostensible. And perhaps nowhere in the world is the heterogeneous nature of the diaspora 
on fuller display than in Southeast Asia. 
To begin, where did Southeast Asia as a region stand in our regression results? 
Figure 26 depicts the region’s position on our prediction graph in regards to state media 
saliency from the quantitative analysis. The region is home to countries with the world’s 
largest share of ethnic Chinese populations in their overall demographics. Three countries 
stood out in this respect: Singapore, where 76% of its populations are ethnic Chinese; 
Malaysia, where 34% are ethnic Chinese; and Thailand, where 14% are ethnic Chinese. On 
the contrary, Southeast Asia, when compared to North America, Europe, and Oceania, has 
witnessed a smaller inflow of recent migrants from Mainland China. Our own dataset 
estimates that between 10–25% of the ethnic Chinese populations in the countries of this 
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region to be recent Mainland Chinese migrants. Consequently, we can see from the 
prediction graph that Chinese state media saliency on the social media of this region to be 
comparably lower than regions with a larger share of new migrants—namely, Australia 
and New Zealand in the previous case study. A similar observation can be made on the 
anticipated volume of anti-China tweets in Southeast Asia’s social media space  
(Figure 27)—where a smaller population of new migrants translate to less anti-China 
sentiments online. 
 





Figure 27. Anti-China Posting Volume Based on Diaspora Size (Southeast Asia 
Highlighted) 
At this point, one might be tempted to conclude that Southeast Asia is a case where 
“less publicity” over China could actually better insulate the PRC from public criticism 
overseas. However, it is important to note that on our prediction graph (Figure 27), the 
differences in the anti-China posts volume as determined by the diaspora size become 
relatively miniscule the farther we move along the X-axis, where most of the Southeast 
Asian countries are profiled. Calculating the sizes of the diasporic groups alone, could also 
risk over-simplifying the complex social dynamics of what has been a continuously 
evolving and fiercely contested diasporic landscape. Indeed, the relatively lower volume 
of anti-China sentiments observed in our data might not have been due to a lack of Chinese 
state media’s saturation into the mainstream, but rather because of the older generations of 
ethnic Chinese staunchly pushing back to retain their own historical and unique identity. 
The rest of this section is dedicated to explain this phenomenon by first retracing the inter-
group tensions between the new and old generations of the ethnic Chinese diaspora and 
then assessing the effect of these tensions on China’s influence abroad. 
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1. Forging a Diaspora-Specific Identity 
The Southeast Asia region represents the largest community of ethnically Chinese, 
or Han Chinese, people residing outside of their ancestral domain. This is evident from the 
mass migration over several centuries of Chinese from Mainland China seeking new homes 
and opportunities afforded by the proximity of the region. This group is in stark contrast to 
the “new” Chinese diaspora consisting of migrants from the PRC following the economic 
reforms of the 1980s. The contrast between the two diasporic sub-groups are particularly 
pronounced in Southeast Asia when compared to the rest of the world. This is primarily 
due to the older generations of ethnic Chinese in this region having already forged their 
own identity from centuries of in-group interactions, often with minimum to no direct 
influence first from Imperial China, and later the Republic of China. In fact, the ethnic 
Chinese diasporas in Southeast Asia have accrued considerable power and influence of 
their own in their adopted homes.  
A survey on the history of the ethnic Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia reveals its 
upward climb to the elite class of political and economic power, and the Chinese diaspora’s 
success can be attributed first and foremost to the pivotal roles they have assumed in the 
region’s business communities. Many academics agree that the Chinese business 
communities are mainly comprised of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) whose 
successful growth is based on the diaspora’s mastery of guanxi (关系), or opportunistic 
relationships with other members of the diaspora.82 The principles of guanxi has led 
Chinese networks to center around “common religious orientation, language or dialect, 
descent affiliations, together with guilds and secret societies.” 83  This economically 
integrated network of connections provides Chinese-owned SMEs the ability to 
monopolize the lower end of the economy ensuring that they remain principal players in 
the subcontracting arrangements made by larger, foreign enterprises. With this comparative 
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advantage, Chinese diasporic businesses find economic opportunities in connecting larger 
corporations with its flexible labor force that can readily respond to market demands and 
maintain a high level of productivity and output.84 Furthermore, the informal, family-
centered nature of Chinese SMEs ensures that the Chinese diaspora maintains control over 
major sectors of their host country’s business economy.85 This modus operandi of Chinese 
businesses in Southeast Asia has provided Huaqiao (华侨) considerable economic influence 
in the region that has not gone unnoticed. 
Economic prestige aside, some experts suggest that the multi-generational presence 
of Huaqiao in Southeast Asia has also rewarded them with significant political capital. 
Since Chinese migration to Southeast Asia began in the mid-19th Century, successive 
generations of ethnic Chinese have successfully integrated into their host communities. In 
Singapore, ethnic Chinese have become assimilated into the island nation with many 
surrendering their ethnic identity in favor of an English-speaking, technocratic Chinse 
Singaporean identity. The political influence of this new group of ethnic Chinese who 
identify as nationalistically Singaporean explains the decline of formerly influential ethno-
centric organizations such as the Chinese Chamber of Commerce due to the new generation 
of Peranankan, or local-born Chinese Singaporeans who now dominate the national 
government.86 This decline in a pure Chinese identity also explains the drop in the usage 
of the Chinese language in Singapore’s education system and consequently an increase in 
efforts to counter the influence of China’s Communist Party. Ironically, one of Singapore’s 
most ardent champions of a multi-racial society, where each ethnicity including the 
predominant Han Chinese race is treated equally, was the Chinese Singaporean prime 
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minister, Lee Kuan Yew. 87  As ethnic Chinese assimilated into their respective host 
countries, they slowly transformed their identity to one that accepts local language, culture, 
and customs to afford them greater political participation and influence in their local 
government. 
But the permeation of political power amongst the Chinese diaspora is not a 
universal trend across the region. Scholars have observed that in countries where ethnic 
Chinese are a small minority group with scant political power, their dominance in business 
and economic activities has produced mixed results in engendering actual political 
influence. The strength of Chinese businesses in these instances has proven to be a double-
edged sword—solidifying the diaspora’s relationships among powerful indigenous 
political players while also hampering the diaspora’s assimilation into the local society, 
and consequently curbing their political potential. For example, the Manadonese-Chinese 
in Indonesia are a minority among the majority Minahasa people but have accrued a 
disproportionate share of economic capital thanks to the prevalence of Chinese businesses, 
best represented by the diaspora’s monopolization of the wholesale and retail sectors in the 
region. These successful Chinese communities have maintained a separation between their 
social and economic relationships, selectively bypassing business relationships with the 
native Minahasan while continuing to pursue social assimilation, albeit with varying 
results.88  In contrast to the Manadonese-Chinese, Chinese Malaysians in Johor Baru have 
learned to pursue relations with politically powerful Malay leaders for the purpose of 
broadening the diaspora’s local alliances. Unsurprisingly, Chinese Malaysians were much 
more successful in evoking their guanxi with the local politicians to transform the ethnic 
Chinese communities’ economic success into concrete political capital.89 The cases of 
Malaysia and Indonesia demonstrate that the Chinese diaspora often seeks out political 
connections outside of their Huaqiao community as a means to maximize their own 
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political worth in their respective host countries. This, in fact, is a survival tactic by a 
minority in the face of a dominating, and oftentimes not so friendly, majority. 
The Chinese diaspora’s journey of assimilation is not without its obstacles. Some 
academics describe the plight of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia as akin to being treated 
as second-class citizens by the indigenous ethnic group. In countries such as Indonesia and 
Malaysia, political leaders have exploited their overseas Chinese communities as political 
scapegoats. For instance, Prime Minister Mahathir Bin Mohamad of Malaysia has routinely 
painted ethnic Malays as victims of the overseas Chinese who were only able to secure 
their current aristocratic positions through their involvement in the country’s colonial past. 
Likewise, General Suharto’s government in Indonesia unleashed anti-Chinese legislation 
banning Chinese newspapers, educational institutions, and organizations.90 Unfortunately 
in many instances, Southeast Asians of Chinese descent have been labeled “as a ‘foreign’ 
Other, leading to their social and political marginalization, despite generations of 
settlement in their country of citizenship and residence.”91 But adversity breeds solidarity. 
The hostilities demonstrated by the indigenous majority eventually spurred the formation 
of a version of ethno-nationalism unique to the Chinese diaspora. 
Indeed, ethno-nationalist sentiments can be a powerful political motivator that 
when threatened can lead to major political and social movements or even conflict. One 
only needs to reflect on the conflicts in the Balkans to understand the powerful impact 
ethno-nationalist sentiments can have in a region rife with ethnic tensions. In the context 
of this study, overseas Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia are uniquely 
distinct with significant economic power to shape national government policies. Should 
the diasporas become threatened by indigenous groups or be provided with external 
opportunities, they could readily leverage their influence to shape national policies to their 
own benefit. But does this suggest that the Chinese diaspora of Southeast Asia will wield 
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their power and influence in support of their ethnic homeland as it rises to a great power 
status? 
2. Rise of Ethno-Nationalism amongst the Chinese Diaspora 
What does the Chinese diasporic version of ethno-nationalism in Southeast Asia 
look like? Southeast Asia’s mainstream media landscape tend to characterize the overseas 
Chinese as being “Chinese first and foremost, with little or no sense of allegiance to the 
countries in which they live.”92 This notion could not be farther from the truth. George 
Hicks reminds us that the “Southeast Asian Chinese have become substantially integrated 
into their adopted societies” while President Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, an ethnic 
Chinese person himself, spoke of his ethnic brothers and sisters as being loyal to their home 
country Singapore, and not to China.93 The diaspora communities are in reality highly 
heterogeneous with differing origins, religious affiliations, economic backgrounds, and 
political allegiances. It is erroneous to assume that their ethno-nationalism is a singular 
expression of pride over Mainland China. Rather, ethno-nationalism is defined differently 
between the two competing sub-groups of the Chinese diaspora. 
Examining the social behaviors of the old and new Chinese diasporas, it is clear 
that there are significant differences between the two groups. The disparities are strong 
enough to discourage meaningful interactions between the old and new generations of 
Chinese. A survey in Japan, for instance, indicated that “only 10% of the elder generation 
of Chinese in Japan agreed to incorporate [voluntary Chinese] associations into their own 
circles, while 70% found it difficult to accommodate them.” 94  In his discussion of 
nationalist sentiments of the global Chinese community, Hong Liu insists that “conflicting 
political persuasions among the Chinese overseas have constituted an impediment to the 
progress of overseas Chinese nationalism in the international arena.”95 Clearly, the global 
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Chinese diaspora is socially and politically heterogeneous deterring the development of a 
unified identity among overseas Chinese and, in fact, causing significant tensions between 
the two groups. 
The social tensions between old and new generations of ethnic Chinese are 
particularly ostensible in Singapore. The small nation state has a majority ethnic Chinese 
population and due to its size has experienced exponentially stronger inter-group tensions 
as the local and Mainland Chinese identities mix in close proximity. Many Singaporeans 
have felt obligated to publicly reaffirm their unique in-group identity as distinctive from 
that of the recent PRC migrants. Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, made it 
a point for Singapore to be the last country in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) to establish diplomatic ties with Beijing. With English as its official working 
language and ongoing efforts to establish uniquely Singaporean cultural references, the 
message from Lee to the world was clearly intended to communicate that Singapore and 
its ethnic Chinese majority population is not an extension of Mainland China.96 
On the other end, China has not remained on the sideline of the ongoing tussle over 
ethnic identity. Beijing has undertaken an aggressive influence campaign to promote its 
own nationalist identity that conflates loyalty to the Chinese heritage with Mainland China, 
or more specifically, the PRC government. The CCP has, in essence, attempted to seize the 
diaspora’s ethno-nationalism and mold it in its favor. With President Xi’s call for the 
participation of overseas Chinese to realize the “Chinese Dream,” this attempt is 
emphasized even more so.97 These efforts, in turn, has tested the allegiance of Chinese 
communities in Southeast Asia, triggering further unease between the old and new 
diasporas. In China’s calculation, a pro-Beijing version of ethno-nationalism could serve 
the party’s political agenda by countering the anti-PRC political narratives originating in 
the diaspora’s host countries. 
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The most susceptible to these influencing efforts involve the 15 million recent 
Chinese migrants, many of whom have maintained active ties with their home country. 
And indeed, as we have seen in the Australia and New Zealand cases, most of these new 
migrants are genuinely pro-Beijing. But here is where the Chinese government might have 
overestimated the strength of its new migrants and underestimated the resolve of the older 
diaspora in this region. We have seen that the more outspoken the new migrants are in 
support of the PRC’s narratives, the more the older generations of diaspora feel obligated 
to defend its unique dual-identity. 
The world might be witnessing a duel between the two competing versions of 
Chinese ethno-nationalism, where the prerogative to define the subject of this term could 
come down to a number’s game after all. Unfortunately for China, in Southeast Asia, the 
population size of the older generations of ethnic Chinese far outnumbers the population 
size of the new migrants from Mainland China. The former group, in turn, might have 
effectively “drowned out” most of the noise from the latter group. As a result, the 
mainstream population never had the opportunity to hear the Chinese state media’s voices. 
Ironically, the “tune up the volume” tactic that was so favored by the PRC against the 
dissident diasporas in Australia and New Zealand might have been repurposed and reversed 
in the case of Southeast Asia. This could provide a distal explanation behind why the 
mainstream online communities in Southeast Asia encountered less circulation of Chinese 
state media narratives and consequently obviated the public’s need to react in one direction 
or the other. 
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VII. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND WAY AHEAD 
A. CONCLUSION 
The quantitative analysis of this study identifies a number of conclusions related to 
the effect of the PRC’s state media apparatus on the social media landscape as it relates to 
the global ethnic Chinese diaspora. This research found significance in the relationship 
between tweets amplifying state media output and the Chinese diaspora in which we 
identify that a large Chinese diaspora presence in a given respective host country does not 
necessarily result in greater salience of Chinese state media narratives belying an essential 
hypothesis of this study. In fact, the presence of a larger Chinese diaspora may have an 
opposite effect of suppressing Chinese state media narratives emanating from the host 
country. Despite this finding, we observe that the presence of newer Chinese migrants may 
actually temper the effect leading to the possible conclusion that a country’s amplification 
of the PRC’s state media is dependent on the level of integration of the Chinese minority 
population. As new migrants assimilate into the host country’s population through the 
attainment of residency and citizenship, the general population’s contribution towards the 
spread of Chinese state media narratives will decrease. 
Furthermore, this study also identified a significant relationship between tweets 
with anti-China characteristics in the form of hashtags and other keywords and the Chinese 
diaspora. We observed that there exists an anti-China backlash through social media 
following the publication of Chinese state media regarding the PRC’s core issues that 
generate controversy among other nations. Furthermore, it would seem that the presence 
of Chinese migrant populations may generate more anti-China sentiments. This suggests 
that perhaps the general population is more aware of controversial PRC issues due to the 
presence of newly arrived ethnic Chinese in the country generating public backlash against 
the Chinese state media narratives. 
The case study analysis section of this study relied on cases from Australia, New 
Zealand and Southeast Asia due to their geographic proximity to the PRC and pervasive 
ethnic Chinese communities residing there. Therefore, these regions generate interesting 
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conclusions illustrating the extent of Chinese state media influence on the Chinese diaspora 
populations. In the case of Australia and New Zealand, recent immigrants from the PRC 
make up nearly half of all ethnic Chinese in the region with many adopting nationalist 
sentiments originating from narratives within their homeland. With the PRC’s 
harmonization of media outlets targeting diasporic Chinese, the Chinese identity has 
become less heterogenous and more pro-CCP. This rise in Chinese nationalism 
commandeered by the Chinese Communist regime, may prove to be detrimental to the 
Chinese state as pro-Beijing narratives only exacerbate political and social tensions within 
the diaspora’s host countries. 
Southeast Asia is home to the largest population of ethnic Chinese diaspora 
globally. The PRC’s more recent media push into the region targeting ethnic Chinese has 
resulted in a significant expansion of Chinese state programming for not only the Chinese-
speaking diaspora but also host country locals who live amongst their minority neighbors. 
Despite the PRC’s media campaign to support its soft power influence among Chinese in 
the region, a majority of the ethnic diaspora has resided in the region for generations with 
immigration occurring since the mid-19th Century. Therefore, the Chinese of Southeast 
Asia who are comfortable with their dual identity status (i.e., Chinese Singaporeans, 
Chinese Filipinos, Chinese Malaysians) have established an “old diaspora” distinguishable 
from more recent Chinese migrants. The PRC’s media campaign to try homogenizing 
overseas Chinese into a single ethno-nationalist identity risks alienating Chinese who hold 
no political allegiance to the Communist state further accentuating the divide between old 
and new Chinese diaspora groups. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research recognizes a variety of implications related to efforts by The People’s 
Republic of China to influence the global ethnic Chinese diaspora to attain political 
objectives. Furthermore, China has not been secretive of its approach to mobilize its ethnic 
people. Under the veil of a “peaceful rise,” Xi Jinping has called for China’s propaganda 
arms to provide a narrative of China’s story indicating the Chinese Communist Party’s 
efforts to influence the global community in support of the Party’s version of China and 
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the Chinese people. Through government institutions such as the United Front Work 
Department, the PRC has conducted a wide range of influence activities targeting both 
domestic and foreign entities. Along with its state-controlled media, Chinese propaganda 
institutions are fully capable to persistently deliver a consistent narrative of China’s Story. 
With its tantamount national security concerns for its core issues involving sovereignty 
including those of the South China Sea, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan, China publicly and 
globally distributes a message supporting the CCP’s biased viewpoint using its state-owned 
media. Understanding China’s motivations and actions involving its influence activities 
presents policy implications that contribute to national security studies in an age of global 
power competition. 
Despite China’s best efforts to inspire a unified and pro-PRC version of Chinese 
nationalism abroad, the global community of ethnic Chinese people proves to be highly 
heterogeneous. Some of the largest Chinese diasporas can be found in Taiwan, Singapore, 
and Hong Kong where the PRC does not have complete sovereign control as it does within 
its own borders. Ethnic Chinese are also spread throughout Southeast Asia representing 
some of the largest diaspora groups of overseas Chinese people who wield considerable 
political and economic power domestically. Even in the United States, Chinese have been 
immigrating into the country since the 19th Century settling primarily in the West Coast 
but expanding across the country over several generations. It is wrong to assume that since 
these are all people with a self-proclaimed “Chinese” identity that their loyalty resides with 
the PRC, a sovereign that has only existed since 1949. In fact, older generations of overseas 
Chinese have developed uniquely dual identities as both ethnically Chinese and as 
members of their host nation. 
1. Policy Recommendation #1: Promote Non-PRC-Sponsored Chinese 
Cultural Programs 
Host nations with Chinese diaspora communities should promote Chinese cultural 
programs recognizing the community as a group proud of its cultural heritage and 
welcomed by the host nation. This should counter PRC-sponsored organizations looking 
to influence the Chinese diaspora communities to include Confucius Institutes. Although 
they provide important cultural and language education, they are also known to advance 
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the narratives specifically approved by the Chinese Communist Party. Therefore, 
alternative Chinese cultural organizations advancing its own cultural education programs 
are capable of presenting a perspective without a pro-PRC political agenda. 
Within the U.S. national security apparatus, Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological 
Operations (PSYOP) units can promote these kinds of cultural programs that present an 
alternate view of the CCP’s “China Story”—one that is based on truth, transparency and 
open to multiple viewpoints. This support can appropriately counter influence activities 
organized by the PRC and develop a more open community of ideas opposed to a monopoly 
of influence by the Chinese government. Furthermore, CA and PSYOP units can contribute 
towards influencing overseas Chinese diaspora communities and host nation populations 
by accentuating the gap between new Chinese migrants and old diaspora communities. 
Recognizing the difference in communities can distinguish between newer migrants who 
are less integrated into the host nation’s society and older generations of ethnic Chinese 
who represent the children, grandchildren or further generations of original Chinese 
immigrants well-integrated into the host nation with more of a dual-identity status (i.e., 
Chinese Singaporean, Chinese American, Chinese Australian). 
2. Policy Recommendation #2: Empower Non-aligned Ethnic Chinese 
within the Online Community 
Virtual Chinatowns are monopolized by the PRC and present a narrative consistent 
with the CCP’s political views. Online communities such as these represent a new 
technological environment capable of influencing individuals and groups toward certain 
political interests. The online space represents a free and open community that can allow 
for a multitude of interest groups. In order to break the monopolies that the PRC has held 
in certain online communities, host nations can empower non-PRC-aligned ethnic Chinese 
to develop websites, social media groups and other online communities through the internet 
medium to counter the biased views of the PRC and CCP. For example, views critical of 
the Chinese government’s position on Uyghurs in Xinjiang or the Dalai Lama can be 
present in online communities led by members of the Chinese diaspora who are not 
staunchly loyal to the PRC government. For example, Facebook groups are popular online 
communities to advance certain interests. Groups such as these that can contribute to a 
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more open and democratic discussion on the PRC’s more controversial political interests 
and can specifically promote more openness in political thought among the global Chinese 
diaspora community. 
Subtle Asian Traits (SAT) is an immensely popular Facebook group established by 
a 21-year-old Chinese Australian from Melbourne. The group focuses on being an open 
community for English-speaking Asians throughout the globe to discuss their culture and 
heritage as members of primarily Western communities. SAT “has become a happy home 
to memes that center on the experience of being a second-generation Asian living in a 
predominantly English-speaking culture.98 Groups like SAT are open, online communities 
that attempt to bring understanding of Asian cultural identity. Groups such as these can be 
developed and moderated by members of the ethnic Chinese diaspora to have open 
discussions outside the authority of the PRC’s censorship. 
3. Policy Recommendation #3: Increase Efforts to Assimilate Ethnic 
Chinese into the Wider Society  
Ethnic Chinese who have as yet to integrate and eventually assimilate into their 
host nation adopting a dual-identity of being Chinese and a member of their host nation 
may be contributing towards political tensions with the PRC’s agenda. Therefore, host 
nation governments should enact policies and promote activities that better integrate ethnic 
Chinese into the local community. This could range from promoting more cultural 
awareness events for the Chinese community to changing immigration policies that 
incentivize Chinese migrants to enjoy the comparative advantages of the host nation (i.e., 
quality education, universal health care) through the attainment of residency or even 
citizenship. Furthermore, certain groups such as non-governmental organizations promote 
the involvement of minority communities in civic engagement and political representation. 
Specific NGOs can engage with the Chinese community and encourage their participation 
in democratic institutions. Assimilation of ethnic Chinese to develop a dual-nation identity 
(i.e., Chinese-Australian, Chinese-American) may not only diversify the host nation but 
                                                 




also advance the sense of civic nationalism in which members of any nation can adopt 
citizenship and nationhood status within their host nation community. 
Students from China represent one of the largest groups of international students 
especially among Western nations. This provides Western governments the opportunity to 
promote Western democratic norms to members of the Chinese diaspora who grew up 
under the PRC’s strict political monopoly of the Communist Party without any knowledge 
of democratic norms. Student organizations in local colleges and universities promoting 
democratic political activism can seek the membership of even minority groups such as 
international Chinese students despite their lack of citizenship. Groups such as these can 
benefit from an alternative political viewpoint involving the benefits of democratic norms 
as enjoyed in Western-style democracies. This can lead to healthy political debates to 
illuminate not only foreign but even domestic students on the spectrum of political 
ideologies. 
C. WAY FORWARD 
Certain limitations of this research study indicate the need for further research in 
this area of academic interest. Despite the detailed analytical method used in the 
quantitative analysis portion of this thesis, more comprehensive data may provide a more 
accurate analysis. State media and Twitter data could only be analyzed during a single year 
period with Twitter data only capturing a tenth of global tweets. Using the methodology in 
this study in concert with multi-year news media and Twitter data archives may confirm 
the findings identified. Furthermore, this study only used Twitter to sample social media 
output; other social media sources such as Facebook and especially those used by ethnic 
Chinese such as Weibo would enhance an analysis of Chinese state media and its 
amplification effect among the Chinese diaspora active in the social media community.  
Despite this study addressing “bot” activity as negligible due to China’s seemingly 
more effective means to manipulate social media conversations with actual people instead 
of automation, computational propaganda may become a more viable investment with the 
development of artificial intelligence and smart computing. As internet usage continues to 
expand along with China’s growing network of relationships globally, Chinese human 
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resources as cyber troops may not be able to keep pace with the state’s requirements toward 
its social media propaganda effort. Future studies should attempt to investigate how bots 
utilized by the Chinese state may enhance the influence of traditional Chinese state media 
output. 
In addition, there exists certain issues concerning accuracy and comprehensiveness 
of this study’s Chinese diaspora data. Poston and Wong’s study on the Chinese diaspora 
was the only source of data used to represent the global ethnic Chinese population to 
include those who are well assimilated or integrated (i.e., attained citizenship) in their 
respective host countries differentiating this data from UN migrant stock data. In their 
study, they drew data resources from the Overseas Chinese Affairs Council in Taiwan 
which could not be contacted for more accurate and comprehensive population data.99 
Therefore, future research should encompass data from more authoritative, first-hand 
sources to include almanacs published by government authorities or robust research studies 
on the Chinese diaspora. 
Despite the case studies used in this research, the Southeast Asia, Australia and 
New Zealand cases only broadly studied the Chinese diaspora in those regions. Future 
studies can further explore ethnic Chinese in a variety of other countries. This can include 
further research into diaspora issues within Western countries (i.e., Great Britain, United 
States) and those with large Chinese populations (i.e., Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia). 
These case studies can further derive comparisons and differences across countries to 
provide a better understanding of the PRC’s influence activities among ethnic Chinese. 
Furthermore, specific cases involving China influencing and eventually co-opting 
members of the ethnic Chinese diaspora to conduct intelligence gathering and other illicit 
activities abroad in support of the PRC’s national security interests may provide depth to 
the study of China’s influence on the diaspora. Due to China rise to great power status and 
its growing exercise of soft power globally, it remains imperative to study the PRC’s 
                                                 









LIST OF REFERENCES 
ABC News. “Hong Kong’s Protest Spread across Australia and Revealing Deep 
Divisions in Chinese Communities.” August 11, 2019. https://www.abc.net.au/
news/2019-08-10/hong-kong-protests-spread-across-australia/11398832. 
Adamson, Fiona. “The Growing Importance of Diaspora Politics.” Current History 115, 
no. 784 (November 2016): 291–297. 
Albert, Eleanor. “China’s Big Bet on Soft Power.” Council on Foreign Relations, 
February 9, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-big-bet-soft-power. 
Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany “The Chinese Community Party is Still Afraid of Sun Yat-
Sen’s Shadow.” Foreign Policy, March 8, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/
03/08/the-chinese-communist-party-is-still-afraid-of-sun-yat-sens-shadow/. 
Alviani, Cedric. China’s Pursuit of a New World Media Order. Paris: Reporters Without 
Borders, 2019. https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/en_rapport_chine_web_final.pdf. 
Angliviel de la Beaumelle, Marcel. “The United Front Work Department: ‘Magic 
Weapon’ at Home and Abroad.” China Brief 17, no. 9 (July 6, 2017). 
https://jamestown.org/program/united-front-work-department-magic-weapon-
home-abroad/. 
Atkins, William. “Brand Power and State Power: Rise of the New Media Networks in 
East Asia.” The Pacific Review 16, no. 4 (2003). 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (object name 3412.0 – Migration, Australia, 2017–18; 
accessed 10 September 2019). https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/
DetailsPage/3412.02017-18?OpenDocument. 
Barker, Thomas. “The Real Source of China’s Soft Power.” The Diplomat, November 28, 
2017. https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/the-real-source-of-chinas-soft-power/. 
Boldurukova, Nazira B. “Potency of the Chinese Diaspora.” Procedia Economics and 
Finance 26 (2015): 34–38. 
Bolsover, Gillian and Philip Howard. “Chinese Computational Propaganda: Automation, 
Algorithms and the Manipulation of Information about Chinese Politics on 




Bowe, Alexander, “China’s Overseas United Front Work.” US-China Economic and 




Bradshaw, Samantha and Philip N. Howard. “The Global Disinformation Disorder: 2019 
Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation.” Working paper, 
University of Oxford, 2019. 
———. “Troops, Trolls and Troublemakers: A Global Inventory of Organized Social 
Media Manipulation.” Working paper, University of Oxford, 2017. 
Brady, Anne-Marie. “Authoritarianism Goes Global (II): China’s Foreign Propaganda 
Machine.” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 4 (October 2015): 55–59. 
———. “Magic Weapon: China’s Political Influence Activities under Xi Jinping.” Paper 
presented at “The Corrosion of Democracy Under China’s Global Influence” 
supported by the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, Arlington, VA, September 
16–17, 2017. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/magicweaponsanne-
mariebradyseptember162017.pdf. 
Brault, Olivier. “The Chinese Diaspora: China’s Instrument of Power?” Master’s thesis, 
School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2010. 
British Broadcasting Corporation. “Hong Kong Protests: What Else is Driving Mainland 
Tensions?” October 1, 2014. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-
29421740. 
Chinese Communist Party Central Publication. “中共中央印发《深化党和国家机构改
革方案》.”  [Deepening party and country’s structural reform proposal]. 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-03/21/c_1122570517.htm. 
China Daily. “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at the 19th CPC National Congress.” 
November 4, 2017. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/
19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm. 
Custer, S., B. Russell, M. DiLorenzo, M. Cheng, S. Ghose, J. Sims, J. Turner, and H. 
Desai. Ties That Bind: Quantifying China’s Public Diplomacy and Its “Good 
Neighbor” Effect. Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary, 2018. 
http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/Ties_That_Bind--Full_Report.pdf. 
D’Hooghe, Ingrid. China’s Public Diplomacy. Boston: Brill, Nijhoff, 2015. 
Ding, Sheng. “Digital Diaspora and National Image Building: A New Perspective on 
Chinese Diaspora Study in the Age of China’s Rise.” Pacific Affairs 80, no. 4 
(Winter 2007/2008): 627–648. 
 
111 
———. “Chinese Soft Power and Public Diplomacy: An Analysis of China’s New 
Diaspora Engagement Policies in the Xi Era.” Working paper, East Asia Institute, 
2014. http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/eng_report/201404011627122.pdf. 
The Economist. “The East is Pink.” August 13, 2016. https://www.economist.com/china/
2016/08/13/the-east-is-pink. 
Fletcher, Paul. “Two Thirds of Adults get News through Social Media.” Forbes, May 28, 
2016. https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulfletcher/2016/05/28/two-thirds-of-adults-
get-news-from-social-media/. 
Frater, Patrick. “China’s Streaming Giants Seek South East Asia Expansion.” Variety, 
April 25, 2019. https://variety.com/2019/digital/asia/china-ott-streaming-giants-
south-east-asia-expansion-1203197624/. 
Freedom House. “New Report Shows Growing International Reach of Chinese Media 
Censorship.” October 22, 2013. https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-
shows-growing-international-reach-chinese-media-censorship. 
Gill, Bates and Benjamin Schreer. “The Global Dimension of China’s Influence 
Operations.” The Strategist, April 11, 2018, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/
global-dimension-chinas-influence-operations/. 
Heath, Timothy. “Beijing’s Influence Operations Target Chinese Diaspora.” War on the 
Rocks (March 1, 2018). https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/beijings-influence-
operations-target-chinese-diaspora/. 
Heng, Michael. “Not fully Chinese? Hong Kong People Have a Fluid Identity – And 
Politics has Nothing to Do with It.” South China Morning Post, January 3, 2017. 
https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2058855/not-fully-
chinese-hong-kong-people-have-fluid-identity-and. 
Hicks, George, and J. A. C. Mackie. “A Question of Identity.” Far Eastern Economic 
Review 157, no. 28 (July 14, 1994): 46–48. 
Hong, Junhao, and Youling Liu. “Internationalization of China’s Television: History, 
development and new trends.” In Routledge Handbook of Chinese Media, edited 
by Gary D. Rawnsley and Ming-yeh T. Rawnsley, 427–445. New York: 
Routledge, 2015. 
Hong, Zhang. “The Globalization of Chinese Television: The Role of the Party-State.” 
The International Gazette (2011): 573–594. 
Hsiao, Russell. “A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Singapore.” 
ChinaBrief 19, no. 13 (July 16, 2019). 
 
112 
King, Charles, and Neil J. Melvin. “Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy, 
and Security in Eurasia.” International Security 24, No. 3 (Winter, 1999–2000): 
108–138. 
King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Robert. “How the Chinese Government 
Fabricates Social Media for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument.” 
American Political Science Review 111, no. 3 (2017): 484–501. 
Kliman, Daniel. Addressing China’s Influence in Southeast Asia: America’s Approach 
and the Role of Congress. https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-
testimony/addressing-chinas-influence-in-southeast-asia-americas-approach-and-
the-role-of-congress. 
Kurlantzick, Joshua. “Australia, New Zealand Face China’s Influence.” Council on 
Foreign Relations. December 13, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/australia-
new-zealand-face-chinas-influence. 
Kuhn, Philip A. Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009. 
Kuo, Mercy A. “China’s United Front Work: Propaganda as Policy.” The Diplomat, 
February 14, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/chinas-united-front-work-
propaganda-as-policy/?allpages=yes&print=yes. 
Lanyon, Charley. “Nine Films that Show How China Influences Hollywood, from Iron 
Man 3 to Top Gun 2.” South China Morning Post, August 20, 2019. 
https://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/entertainment/article/3023568/nine-films-show-
how-china-influences-hollywood-iron-man-3. 
Li, Phoebe Hairong. A Virtual Chinatown: The Diasporic Mediasphere of Chinese 
Migrants in New Zealand. Auckland: The University of Auckland, 2009.  
Lim, Louisa, and Julia Bergin. “Inside China’s Audacious Global Propaganda 
Campaign.” The Guardian, December 7, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/
news/2018/dec/07/china-plan-for-global-media-dominance-propaganda-xi-
jinping. 
Lin, Kat. “The Story of the Subtle Asian Traits Facebook Group.” The New Yorker, 
December 22, 2018. https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-story-
of-the-subtle-asian-traits-facebook-group. 
Liu, Hong. “New Migrants and the Revival of Overseas Chinese Nationalism.” Journal 
of Contemporary China 14, no. 43 (2005): 291–316. 
 
113 
Livermore, Doug. “China’s Three Warfares in Theory and Practice in the South China 
Sea.” Georgetown Security Studies Review, March 28, 2018. 
http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2018/03/25/chinas-three-warfares-in-
theory-and-practice-in-the-south-china-sea/. 
Lowy Institute. China – Lowy Institute Poll 2019. Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute, 
2019. https://lowyinstitutepoll.lowyinstitute.org/themes/china/. 
Lu, Jiajie. “Understanding the Chinese Diaspora: The Identity Construction of Diasporic 
Chinese in the Age of Digital Media.” Doctoral thesis, Queensland University of 
Technology, 2017. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/112817/1/Jiajie_Lu_Thesis.pdf. 
Machado, Kit G. “Japanese Transnational Production Networks and Ethnic Chinese 
Business Networks in East Asia: Linkages and Regional Integration.” In Ethnic 
Business: Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia, edited by K. S. Jomo and Brian 
C. Folk, 211–234. New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003. 
Martin, Fran. “How Chinese Students Exercise Free Speech Abroad.” The Economist, 
June 11, 2018. https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/06/11/how-chinese-
students-exercise-free-speech-abroad. 
Michael, Katina. “Bots Without Borders: How Anonymous Accounts Hijack Political 
Debate.” The Conversation 25 (January 2017): 1–3. 
Montague, Zach. “Under Xi, China’s State Propaganda Evolves for the Social Media 
Age.” World Politics Review (March 13, 2017). 
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/21498/under-xi-china-s-state-
propaganda-evolves-for-the-social-media-age. 
Nikkei Asian Review. “Xi’s Secret Economic Weapon: Overseas Chinese.” April 3, 2017. 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Xi-s-secret-economic-weapon-Overseas-
Chinese2. 
Nip, Joyce, and Chao Sun. “China’s News Media Tweeting, Competing with U.S. 
Sources.” Westminister Papers in Communication and Culture 13, no. 1 (2018): 
98–122. 
Nonini, Donald M. “All Are Flexible, but Some Are More Flexible than Others.” In 
Ethnic Business: Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia, edited by K. S. Jomo and 
Brian C. Folk, 73–91. New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003. 
Nye, Joseph S. Jr. Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics. New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2005. 




Ong, Aihwa. “Cyberpublics and Diaspora Politics Among Transnational Chinese.” 
Interventions 5, no. 1 (2003): 82–100. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/
10.1080/13698032000049815. 
Orjuela, Camilla. “Distant Warriors, Distant Peace Workers? Multiple diaspora roles in 
Sri Lanka’s violent conflict.” Global Networks 8, no. 4 (October 2008): 436–452. 
Ortmann, Stephan and Mark R. Thompson, “China and the ‘Singapore Model.’” The 
Journal of Democracy 27, no. 1, (January 2016): 39–48.  
Poston Jr., Dudley and Juyin Helen Wong, “The Chinese Diaspora: The Current 
Distribution of the Overseas Chinese Population.” Chinese Journal of Sociology 
2, no. 3 (2016): 348–373. 
Priebe, Jan, and Robert Rudolf, “Does the Chinese Diaspora Speed Up Growth in Host 
Countries?.” World Development 76 (2015): 249–262. 
Qin, Amy. “Worries Grow in Singapore Over China’s Calls to Help ‘Motherland.’” The 
New York Times, August 5, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/05/world/
asia/singapore-china.html. 
Qing, Koh Gui, and John Shiffman. “Beijing’s Covert Radio Network Airs China-
Friendly News across Washington, and the World.” Reuters, November 2, 2015. 
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-radio/. 
Quackenbush, Casey et al., “Press Freedom is under Attack across Southeast Asia. Meet 
the Journalists Fighting Back.” Time, June 22, 2018, https://time.com/longform/
press-freedom-southeast-asia/. 
Rawnsley, Gary D. “Chinese International Broadcasting, Public Diplomacy and Soft 
Power.” In Routledge Handbook of Chinese Media, edited by Gary D. Rawnsley 
and Ming-yeh T. Rawnsley, 460–475. New York: Routledge, 2015. 
Robinson, Piers. “Media as a Driving Force in International Politics: The CNN Effect and 
Related Debates.” GP Opinion (blog). Global Policy, October 8, 2013. 
https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/08/10/2013/media-driving-force-
international-politics-cnn-effect-and-related-debates. 
Rogin, Josh. “China’s Interference in the 2018 Elections Succeeded – In Taiwan.” The 
Washington Post, December 18, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2018/12/18/chinas-interference-elections-succeeded-taiwan/. 
Schmitz, Rob. “Australia and New Zealand Are Ground Zero For Chinese Influence.” 




Shain, Yossi and Aharon Barth. “Diaspora and International Relations Theory.” 
International Organization 57, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 449–479. 
Sun, Wanning. Chinese-Language Media in Australia: Development, Challenges and 
Opportunities. Ultimo, New South Wales, Australia: Australia-China Relations 




———. “Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Consumption, and Transnational 
Imagination.” Journal of Chinese Overseas, vol. 1, (May 2005): pp. 65–86. 
———. “Motherland Calling: China’s Rise and Diasporic Responses.” Cinema Journal 
49, no. 3 (Spring 2010): 126–130. 
United Nations database (object name POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2017; accessed June 22, 
2019). https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/
estimates2/data/UN_MigrantStockTotal_2017.xlsx. 
Wang, Xiangwei. “The Question Facing Chinese Diaspora: For Love of Country or 
Party?” South China Morning Post, July 22, 2018. https://www.scmp.com/week-
asia/politics/article/2155747/question-facing-chinese-diaspora-love-country-or-
party. 
Wee, Vivienne, Michael Jacobsen, and Tiong Chong Wong. “Positioning Strategies of 
Southeast Asian Chinese Entrepreneurs.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 36, no. 3 
(2006): 364–384. 
Wong, Sin Kiong, Ruixin Wang, Zhuo Wang, and Shihlun Allen Chen. “Producing and 
Reconstructing Knowledge on China in Singapore: Perspectives from the 
Academics and Mass Media.” Asian Ethnicity 16, no. 1 (2015): 8–27. 
Woolley, Samuel C. “Automating power: Social Bot Interference in Global Politics.” 
First Monday 21, no. 4 (April 4, 2016). https://firstmonday.org/article/view/6161/
5300. 
Xinhua. “Hu Jintao Seeks to Enhances Cultural Appeal.” October 15, 2007. “以民促官、
以经促政--陈昊苏评点 2006 年中国民间外交.” http://news.sina.com.cn/
w/2006-12-21/170410831490s.shtml. 
Zeng, Jinghan, Yuefan Xiao, and Shaun Breslin, “Securing China’s Core Interests: The 
State of the Debate in China.” International Affairs 91, no. 2 (March 2015): 245–
266. 
Zhang, Xiaoling. “Chinese State Media Going Global.” East Asian Policy 2, no. 1 (Jan/
Mar 2010): 42–50. 
 
116 
Zhang, Yinxian, Jiajun Liu, and Ji-Rong Wen. “Nationalism on Weibo: Towards a 
Multifaceted Understanding of Chinese Nationalism.” The China Quarterly 235 
(2018): 758–783. 
Zhuang, Pinghui. “The Rise of the Little Pink Digital Warriors.” South China Morning 





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
